Israeli airstrikes on Sunday hit facilities in the Scientific Research Studies Center (CERS) in Syria’s Masyaf, which are said to be used by Iran and its proxies to produce chemical weapons, killing 14 people, Syria media reported.
Israel's defense minister revealed in 2022 that the facilities at the Scientific Research Studies Center in Masyaf were being used by Iran to produce advanced missiles and weapons for its proxies. Benny Gantz made the remarks following an Israeli airstrike on the sites at the time, but the strikes do not seem to have removed the threat, as the facilities were once again targeted on September 8, 2024.
Late Sunday night, a series of Israeli airstrikes hit multiple locations across central Syria, resulting in the deaths of at least five individuals and injuring 19 more, according to Syrian state media. The strikes caused fires and damaged infrastructure in the area, with firefighting teams battling to control the flames into the early hours of Monday.
Two regional intelligence sources told Reuters a major military research center for chemical arms production located near Masyaf was hit several times. It is believed to house a team of Iranian military experts involved in weapons production.
Syria’s official news agency, SANA, reported that the country's air defense systems responded to what they called an "aggression" targeting several points in the central region, specifically in Hama province. One of the strikes damaged a highway in the province, further complicating the situation on the ground.
Faysal Haydar, the director of Masyaf National Hospital in western Hama province, confirmed the number of casualties, which SANA says were all civilians.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a UK-based war monitoring group, also confirmed the strikes and reported that one of the targeted sites was part of the CERS in Masyaf, a location known to house Iranian militias and weapons experts. These forces have reportedly been stationed in Syria to assist in developing military capabilities for the Assad regime, the report said.
“Under the vision of Soleimani, Iran transformed CERS in Syria's Masyaf into production facilities for mid and long-range, precise missiles and weapons, provided to Hezbollah and Iranian proxies. These sites host significant threats to the region and to Israel," Benny Gantz said in September 2022.
Israel’s Alma, an institute focused on threats to northern Israel, has revealed in a detailed report that “Iran’s major focus is to develop and manufacture precision missiles and rockets, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Syrian soil”.
Israel’s Alma, an institute focused on threats to northern Israel, has revealed in a detailed report that “Iran’s major focus is to develop and manufacture precision missiles and rockets, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Syrian soil”. Operations are centered around the CERS Center, which is the heart of Syria's military industry. Established in 1971, the institute has transformed into a collaborative platform involving Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah since the beginning of the civil war, according to Alma's statement.
Over the years, Syria’s CERS Center has been shown to be accountable for the research, development, and military production of advanced weapons such as surface-to-surface missiles such as the M-600 / Fateh-110 missile, which is “at the heart of the joint Iranian-Syrian and Hezbollah precision project", Alma reported. More alarmingly, it states that “the CERS Center is responsible for developing and manufacturing chemical, biological, and potentially nuclear weapons”.
Also on Sunday, local media reported strikes near Damascus and the coastal city of Tartous, though details on the extent of the damage or casualties in that area were limited at the time.
The incident marks yet another escalation in the ongoing conflict in Syria, with Israeli airstrikes becoming a frequent occurrence, particularly targeting sites linked to Iranian forces operating in the country. While Israel rarely confirms such operations, it has repeatedly stated that it will not tolerate Iran’s military presence in Syria, which it views as a direct threat to its national security.
His statement, made during a visit by President Masoud Pezeshkian to the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters, came in the wake of weeks of tensions following the killing of Hamas's political chief, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran.
Salami justified the attacks by claiming they were in retaliation for strikes on 14 Iranian oil tankers in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean—accusations he placed on Israel, albeit with no evidence.
Since 2019, the IRGC has attacked or boarded numerous commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf region, often claiming that they were Israeli ships.
Salami’s remarks, laden with Tehran's usual conspiratorial tone, stated that Israel's attacks were designed to stymie Iran’s oil exports. However, what Salami left out is that when he refers to “Israeli ships,” these were commercial vessels, not military targets, perhaps partially owned by individuals of Israeli descent. This kind of rhetoric usually accompanies Tehran’s attempts to defend and justify its behavior on the international stage.
Israeli officials have so far remained silent on these claims. Salami’s statements follow a pattern of Iran seizing foreign vessels under dubious pretenses. This includes the seizure of oil tankers, such as the British-flagged Stena Impero in 2019 and, most recently, the Marshall Islands-flagged St. Nikolas in the Gulf of Oman.
Iran’s approach to maritime security seems to hinge on hostage diplomacy. The 2019 seizure of the Grace 1 by British authorities, on suspicion of breaching sanctions by transporting oil to Syria, was met with a retaliatory move by the IRGC, which seized the Stena Impero.
In January, Tehran seized the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker St. Nikolas and also expanded its maritime provocations, attacking the M/V Pacific Gold tanker, registered in Liberia with a drone in the Indian Ocean.
IRGC’s chief commander attempted to justify such actions by referencing sanctions, military threats, or even former US President Donald Trump, whom Salami described as being "no less of a threat than COVID-19."
Iranian officials appear to be concerned about Trump's possible return to the presidency, expecting a tougher policy by Washington than what has transpired during the Biden administration.
Vice Adm. Brad Cooper of the US 5th Fleet earlier made it clear that Iran’s actions “violate international law and pose a threat to maritime security and stability.” Yet, despite these warnings, Tehran seems determined to continue its behavior, using the high seas as yet another battlefield in its ongoing quest for regional dominance.
Iran has long accused the semi-autonomous Kurdish government in northern Iraq of harboring groups, all under the Komala name, which Tehran labels as terrorist organizations. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has frequently launched attacks on their bases, claiming these groups pose a threat to the security of the Islamic Republic.
In March 2023, the governments of Iran and Iraq signed a ‘border security’ agreement that was, in essence, a plan to curb the activities of Iran’s Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq. The agreement led to partial evacuation of Komala bases in September 2023. The move now seems to have been completed, with the three Kurdish parties, with military wings, leaving their camps in the Zirgwez region near Sulaymaniyah and settling in camps in Suwardash near Dukan.
The new location is in fact closer to the border with Iran but less accessible, according to Komala sources who talked to Iran International on condition of anonymity. “The ability to transport and maintain weapons, especially the semi-heavy and heavy weapons of the Peshmerga forces, has effectively been taken from them,” one member said.
He added that by forcing a move of the Komala inside another country’s territory, Iran's government has sent a “clear message” that it can do “whatever it wants” and neither the Iraqi central government nor the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq can stop it.
The groups say they oppose the clerical regime in Iran, but many Iranians also view them as separatists, who harbor designs on Iran's Kurdish populated areas in the west.
Iran’s government, through its IRGC Quds Force, enjoys considerable sway over authorities in Iraq, both in Baghdad and Erbil, the Kurdish regional capital. On occasions, however, the relationship has bittered over IRGC attacks on Kurdish groups.
Tehran Erbil security cooperation
Nechirvan Barzani, the President of Iraq's Kurdistan Region, made an unexpected visit to Iran in May, where he met with top leaders, sparking strong criticism from opponents of the Iranian regime.
During his visit, Barzani engaged with key figures of the government, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, heads of executive and legislative bodies, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, the foreign minister, and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
The timing and nature of Barzani's visit, coming months after the IRGC's missile attack on the Kurdistan Region, raised questions about its motives. The high-profile meetings suggest that the discussions likely focused on mutual security concerns.
In January, the Iraqi government recalled its ambassador from Tehran after an IRGC missile attack on Erbil killed four civilians and injured six others. The attack caused a popular outrage in Iraqi Kurdistan and thousands took to the streets denouncing the IRGC's ‘free hand’ in their region.
The IRGC claimed the target had been an Israeli “spy headquarter” in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, but the Kurdish prime minister Masrour Barzani categorically denied the claims and called the attack a “crime against the Kurdish people.”