Trump's fix for the Middle East could be Jared Kushner, again

These retirees, who include those who traveled from cities across Iran, say they have yet to receive 60 percent of their promised retirement benefits after 30 years of teaching.

During the demonstration, they chanted slogans such as “Incompetent minister, resign, resign,” “A nation has never seen such injustice,” “One fewer embezzlement, and our problem is solved,” and “Teacher, rise up to end discrimination.”

Images circulating on social media show that some retirees had slept in Tehran’s parks the night before, braving the cold to ensure they could attend the protest.

Reports from retiree and teacher networks indicate that the protest will continue on Monday, November 11, outside the Ministry of Education building in Tehran.

Last month the minister of education, Alireza Kazemi said that 50 percent of retiree payments would be allocated in the budget for the current and next fiscal years to address payment delays. However, these retired educators, some of whom have been waiting over a year post-retirement, have yet to receive their end-of-service bonuses.

This protest follows an earlier demonstration on October 22, when retirees gathered outside Tehran’s Social Security Organization.

Despite promises from the authorities, the retirees say that delays in their unpaid wages are eroding the value of their money, ILNA reported on Sunday.

Amid rising tensions with Israel, the Iranian rial last week plunged to a historic low of less than 1/10,000th of its pre-Islamic Republic value, trading at over 705,000 rials to the US dollar in Iran's free market

Amid soaring inflation over 40%, the rial’s continued decline has deepened Iran's economic crisis, leaving retirees struggling as their unpaid pensions lose value daily.

London-based Iranian labor rights activist Sattar Rahmani says the protests were entirely self-organized, with retirees independently mobilizing across cities in Iran, gathering outside the ministry in Tehran to once again voice their long-standing demands.

He sharply criticized Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration’s budget for next year as “entirely military-oriented,” emphasizing that funds have been allocated to security forces while essential sectors like education are neglected.

Pezeshkian unveiled next year’s budget recently, allocating nearly 20% of Iran’s oil export revenue—estimated to exceed $10 billion—exclusively to the Revolutionary Guard.

“There should be a budget set aside to ensure that the needs of education are met, so that teachers can be supported and don’t end up living below the poverty line,” Rahmani said in an interview with Iran International. He argued that Pezeshkian's administration is continuing the militaristic approach of Raisi’s government, leaving crucial societal needs, like education, unmet.

The militants attacked a watchtower in Sirkan area of Saravan near the Iranian-Pakistani border on Sunday evening, killing five members of the IRGC's Basij paramilitary forces, Mansour Bijar, the governor-general of Sistan-Baluchestan, told the state-run television.

Bijar stated that the victims were all local Baloch Sunni Muslims, while the insurgents were neither Baloch nor Sunni and had come from the neighboring country.

The victims have been identified as Abdulrahman Baluchzahi, Shahbakhsh Baluchzahi, Abdullah Baluchzahi, Wahid Baluchzahi, and Bashir Sepahi.

The IRGC's Ground Force announced in a statement that the assailants are at large, and the Revolutionary Guard has launched a manhunt.

Videos released by local news outlets like Haalvsh show IRGC surveillance drones flying over the city of Saravan to find the militants.

The attack came nine days after four militants were killed and eight others arrested in a joint operation by the IRGC and the Islamic Republic's intelligence ministry.

The November 1 operation was launched in response to an October 26 attack by Sunni Baloch group Jaish al-Adl in the city of Taftan in southeastern Iran, during which 10 Iranian border guards were killed.

The Jaish al-Adl attack was condemned by the United Nations Security Council as a "cowardly terrorist attack."

Iran's Sistan-Baluchestan province has been the site of numerous attacks attributed to Jaish al-Adl, a group known for its history of ambushes, bombings, and other violent operations, resulting in the deaths of both civilians and security personnel.

Jaish al-Adl advocates for an independent Balochistan that includes Baloch communities on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border and has carried out numerous armed attacks in southeastern Iran.

In January, the IRGC announced it had carried out missile and drone strikes on the militant group’s bases within Pakistani territory. The rare cross-border offensive angered Pakistani officials and led Islamabad to respond with airstrikes on several sites in southeastern Iran.

The release of a 2.5-hour interview in which Abbas Palizdar discusses a 54,000-page document detailing corruption cases involving 52 senior officials and their inner circles has sent shockwaves through Iran’s political sphere, sparking numerous questions about possible motives.

The selective nature of these revelations that mainly target officials who are no longer alive or relevant, coupled with the timing of their release, suggests a calculated strategy rather than a genuine commitment to fighting corruption.

Throughout the interview, Palizdar, who served as the secretary of the Judiciary Inquiry and Review Committee in the parliament in early 2000s and is an apparent ally of Mojtaba Khamenei, used every opportunity to portray him as a potential savior who can cleanse the establishment of corruption.

By spotlighting the misdeeds of past leaders, particularly those who are deceased or out of power, the revelations appear to be deflecting attention from ongoing corruption, while positioning Mojtaba Khamenei as a viable successor. This strategy, noted by social media commentators in the absence of a free press, aims to shape public perception amidst growing discontent.

"Based on the information I have, I hope that his [Mojtaba Khamenei’s] succession will happen soon," Palizdar stated. "With Mojtaba stepping into the country’s leadership, we can expect fundamental reforms. There’s no one more knowledgeable about executive matters and the country’s situation than him. He also has the strength to crush economic corruption at its core."

However, some commentators speaking on Persian language networks outside Iran noted that the allegations of corruption could have also been aimed at discrediting Khamenei and his son. After all, all the cases mentioned happened under Ali Khamenei's watch.

Among the names of corrupt officials revealed by Palizdar are Mohammad Yazdi and Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, both former heads of Iran's all-powerful judiciary, and Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, a former parliament speaker and Mojtaba Khamenei’s father-in-law.

Palizdar said Yazdi, the first head of the judiciary after the 1979 revolution, held his position for 10. He added Yazdi used his position to secure control of Dena Tire Company for his family, seize 3,000 hectares of land in northern Iran, and even use seized judicial funds as personal property. Yazdi enjoyed Khamenei's support during his tenure.

Palizdar also accused Shahroudi, who led the judiciary for the next 10 years after Yazdi, of taking the Mouteh gold mine in Isfahan and cleric Mohammad Emami Kashani, Khamenei’s representative to lead Tehran Friday prayers, of taking the Dehbid stone mine in Fars province, among the biggest in the world.

Mojtaba Khamenei, now 55 years old, became more prominent in discussions of succession after Mehdi Karroubi, a cleric under house arrest, directly accused him of playing a critical role in securing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2005 presidential election.

In April 2023, a leaked document reportedly from a confidential meeting between senior IRGC commanders and the Supreme Leader suggested that Mojtaba Khamenei was actively pursuing the succession project. The document also implied that Mojtaba had begun influencing high-level appointments, bypassing figures such as Ebrahim Raisi, a former frontrunner for leadership.

The theory of Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession gained further attention following the death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash earlier this year.

Sadegh Mohammadi, Vice President of the General Assembly of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, described Mojtaba Khamenei as a “jurisprudent and Muslim scholar” in March. He also suggested that Mojtaba could be “one of the future leadership candidates.”

The Israeli Democracy Institute found that on the Left and in the Center, the largest proportion of respondents think that the response was appropriately strong (46% and 48%, respectively), while a large minority hold that the response was too weak (Left, 28%; Center, 32%).

On the Right, however, the largest share of respondents (51%) think the response was too weak, and 41% that it was appropriately strong.

Responses were analyzed by vote in the 2022 Knesset elections. The IDI said: “We found a surprising degree of agreement, for which we have no satisfactory explanation, between the Zionist right-wing parties—the Likud and Religious Zionism, the majority of whose voters think that Israel’s response to the Iranian missile attack was too weak (50.5% and 56%, respectively).”

Of the Arab parties, Ra’am and Balad, voters are even more of the opinion that Israel’s response was too weak (54% and 67%, respectively), the IDI found.

In Israel, its Arab population is made up of Druze, Muslims, Christians and Baha'i.

In terms of the national mood while Israel is fighting Iran’s militias from across the region, the IDI found things have improved.

“Presumably due to Israel’s military successes in Lebanon, and perhaps due to the repulsion of the Iranian missile strike with relatively minor damage, we found a substantial increase in optimism among the Israeli public this month about the future of national security, and a slight increase in optimism about the future of democratic rule,” the center said.

Israel and Iran’s war of attrition escalated this year following Iran’s inaugural attack on Israel in April. It followed the alleged Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus which killed at least two senior Quds Force generals and other IRGC figures.

A second Iranian attack followed on October 1 in retaliation for the targeted killings of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders. Israel retaliated on October 26, targeting key strategic sites in Iran.

An alleged Israeli attack on July 31 killed the political head of Iran-backed Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran. Another air strike in September killed the head of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hassan Nasrallah, triggering almost 200 ballistic missiles to be fired at the Jewish state last month. Israel retaliated with an hours-long aerial attack on critical infrastructure and military sites.

The outages, scheduled from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., are part of a government strategy to conserve fuel and reduce reliance on mazut, a pollutant-heavy oil, as power plants struggle to meet demand.

Although initial plans aimed to limit blackouts to certain provinces, the inclusion of Tehran province highlights the growing urgency of the situation. The new plan does not affect the capital itself but will result in power outages in surrounding cities and towns.

Iran’s energy infrastructure is grappling with one of its most challenging winters. Facing a critical natural gas, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration has prioritized avoiding the widespread burning of mazut, a high-sulfur fuel oil, as a substitute at major power plants in cities like Arak, Isfahan, and Karaj.

To mitigate mazut emissions, the government ordered planned blackouts, with power cuts announced across several provinces. By Sunday morning, Tehran’s electricity distribution company joined the list, publishing a blackout schedule before the website quickly became inaccessible due to traffic surges.

This measure has been presented as an environmental alternative to mazut, with officials citing health concerns associated with the fuel’s toxic emissions.

On November 7, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani supported the blackouts on social media, saying that “scheduled blackouts can temporarily replace toxic emissions” from mazut.

The fuel shortages have left power plants scrambling, with limited gas and diesel reserves forcing heavy reliance on mazut. As of mid-November, ministry of energy data indicates that gas supply to power plants dropped 30% compared to the previous year, with diesel reserves reduced to less than 1.26 billion liters. The drop in liquid fuel stocks comes after a 36% reduction from 2022, adding pressure to an already strained power grid.

Political justifications and public reactions

Amid this crisis, some government officials have placed partial blame on the public, saying that high domestic energy consumption is contributing to the shortages. Mohammad Jafar Ghaempanah, executive deputy for Pezeshkian, urged citizens to lower heating use and electricity consumption, calling high demand a significant factor in the blackouts. He pointed to energy subsidies as part of the issue, suggesting that low prices encourage excessive consumption. However, critics argue that the government’s infrastructure management rather than consumer behavior, is the root of the crisis.

Chairman of the Board of the Electricity Syndicate Hassanali Taghizadeh has pushed back on claims that domestic use is disproportionately high, saying that Iranian households consume about half the electricity per capita compared to Europe.

“It’s wrong to say that public consumption is high. Our people consume far less electricity than the world, but we’re used to shifting blame onto them,” he said, calling for structural solutions rather than reliance on temporary blackouts.

Iran has the world's second largest natural gas reserves but years of negligence to invest in the gas fields and Western sanctions have reduced production.

Outlook on Iran’s energy policy

With around 80% of Iran’s electricity derived from thermal power plants reliant on gas, the administration faces mounting pressure to address what experts say is a systemic fuel shortages. Energy committee member Sepahvand said that without consistent gas supplies, disruptions may persist across both household and industrial sectors in the months ahead. Yet, long-term solutions, such as substantial investment in infrastructure or energy alternatives, remain elusive, leaving Iran reliant on interim measures like scheduled blackouts and continued mazut use.

Iran’s winter energy crisis has highlighted the country’s reliance on emergency measures, as officials grapple with a resource shortage exacerbated by decades of underinvestment. With blackouts set to continue, questions over energy policy and sustainability linger as winter sets in.