Q&A: What was Khamenei’s role in the 2015 nuclear deal?

The law mandates extensive surveillance of public spaces to identify women who fail to comply with full hijab regulations, imposing hefty fines and even prison sentences on violators.

The new law also demands businesses including hospitality establishments, retail shops, and taxi services refuse service to unveiled women or report them to the authorities to avoid being penalized themselves.

"The main goal of those insisting on the implementation of the hijab law, in my view, is to bring down Pezeshkian’s government," prominent reformist politician and journalist Abbas Abdi wrote on Wednesday.

Many others, from reformist politician and former vice-president Masoumeh Ebtekar to conservative Qom Seminary teacher Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohsen Gharavian have objected to the provisions of the hijab law ultra-hardliners insist must be implemented.

The government must reject and protest to the hijab law, Gharavian who argues that the punishments stipulated in the law, such as withdrawing the fine for unveiling from people’s bank accounts without their consent, is unacceptable even from the religious point of view, Gharavian said in an interview with Khabar Online news website Tuesday.

According to Pezeshkian’s special aide in matters of social freedoms and rights, Sakineh-Sadat Paad, the President is planning to consult with Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf in a meeting of the heads of the three government forces to find a solution for the problem.

The rush to implement a law that is questionable to Muslim religious jurists, legal experts, sociologists, and others is not rational, she argued in an X post a day before Pezeshkian’s televised interview Monday. “A good law must be acceptable to the society,” she added.

Since the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom protests, a significant number of Iranian women have refused to wear the hijab, often facing confrontations with morality police in the streets. Beyond the oppressive nature of the new law, individuals close to the Islamic government worry that violent enforcement of hijab regulations could ignite social unrest.

As president, Pezeshkian is required to give the new law official status by signing it and communicating it to all government bodies for implementation. In a televised interview Monday, he insisted that it would be hard to implement and warned that its enforcement would lead to widespread discontent in Iranian society.

Pezeshkian also said he was conferring with other top officials to find a way not to enforce the hijab law.

Critics of the new law within Iran's political establishment, spanning from reformists to numerous conservatives, have called on President Pezeshkian to appeal to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to use his extraordinary powers to issue a decisive ruling and resolve the impasse.

Critics suggest that Pezeshkian could attempt to persuade Khamenei that enforcing the new law runs counter to public and national interests, urging him to either order its suspension or refer the matter to a state body for further deliberation.

Pezeshkian can request through a letter to the Supreme Leader to ask him to have the law removed from the country’s agenda because it is against the fundamental rights of the nation, public interests and national interests, the reformist Sazandegi newspaper wrote Monday.

Khamenei, who has consistently maintained that everyone must adhere to hijab laws regardless of their personal beliefs because "it is the law," has so far refrained from commenting on the new legislation.

Another option critics, including prominent lawyer and member of the central council of the reformist Servants of Construction Party, Mahmoud Alizadeh-Tabatabaei, have proposed is for Pezeshkian to bring the issue before the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). They contend that the Council holds the authority to suspend the law’s implementation if it determines the matter impacts national

As president, Pezeshkian heads the SNSC. Nevertheless, nearly all the other members including the chiefs of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), Police, and Joint Staff of the Armed forces are directly appointed by Khamenei and answer only to him, not the president.

Article 176 of the Iranian Constitution also stipulates that all the decisions taken by the Council must be endorsed by the Supreme Leader to become effective.

A third solution proposed by others, including a group of legal experts who penned an open letter to Pezeshkian, is to call for a national referendum on the issue. Alternatively, the legal experts suggest referring the matter to the Expediency Council, which, under Article 112 of the Constitution, can deliberate on any issue assigned to it by the Supreme Leader.

The proposal to hold a referendum, however, requires the approval of two-thirds of all members of Parliament which s dominated by hardliners and ultra-hardliners. The hijab law was approved in the previous term of the parliament in October 2023. However, ultra-hardliners have a stronger foothold in the new Parliament which started work in late May.

"In case of a snapback reinstatement, one of the options we proposed was withdrawing from the NPT ... we could leave the treaty," deputy foreign minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi was quoted as saying by a parliamentary spokesman on Tuesday.

The remarks followed Takht-Ravanchi's discussions in Geneva with representatives from the UK, France, and Germany — the three European signatories to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

"We did not negotiate in Geneva because we had no text, and there was no text to negotiate on," Takht-Ravanchi said.

The Geneva talks were held in the wake of a controversial resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors, which calls for a report on Iran’s nuclear program and its lack of full cooperation with the IAEA by spring 2024.

This resolution could trigger the activation of the snapback mechanism, a provision within the JCPOA that would automatically restore international sanctions on Iran and potentially bring the country under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

The resolution, marking the second such action against Iran in two years, has prompted Iran to announce it will activate new and advanced centrifuges as a retaliatory measure.

"Unfortunately, our enemies have made Iran’s nuclear file very complicated and politicized," said Behrooz Kamalvandi, spokesperson for Iran's Atomic Energy Organization.

The breakdown in negotiations between Iran and the three European countries reflects broader diplomatic tensions. Efforts to revive the JCPOA, which collapsed after the United States withdrew under President Donald Trump in 2018, have stalled under Presidents Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi.

"We have no intention of negotiating with Washington at this time, as there is no basis for such talks," Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said recently, adding that Iran would reassess its approach once the new US administration’s policies become clearer.

However, some within President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration have shown interest in potential talks with the United States, particularly those aligned with the more moderate camp.

Among them, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Pezeshkian's strategic deputy, wrote in an article in Foreign Affairs magazine that Trump should pursue an agreement that benefits both sides.

“The West needs a more constructive approach—one that takes advantage of Iran’s hard-earned confidence, accepts Iran as an integral part of regional stability, and seeks collaborative solutions to shared challenges," he wrote. "Such shared challenges could even prompt Tehran and Washington to engage in conflict management rather than exponential escalation.”

Reformist-leaning media in Iran criticized Elmira Sharifi-Moghaddam, a female anchor for state TV channel IRINN, for posing challenging questions to President Pezeshkian about the state of the economy.

Commentators seen as reformists argued that her questions were unfair, overlooking long-standing issues Pezeshkian faces, such as sanctions and a deeply inefficient economic system.

However, the questions raised during the interview were far less probing than those typically posed by European or American TV anchors. The interview's style appeared intentionally crafted to align with state TV's political leanings, closely tied to the ultraconservative Paydari party, whose members are known to influence the broadcaster's news and current affairs policies.

A former Tehran mayor, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, who owns and runs the centrist daily Ham Mihan, criticized the President's decision to participate in a live one-hour interview on state television. 

In an article for Iran, the state-owned newspaper, Karbaschi argued that Pezeshkian should have refused the format dictated by state television, instead asserting control over when and how he addressed the nation

"He should have changed the state TV's game and chosen when and for how long to speak to the public," Karbaschi suggested, adding that Pezeshkian could have delivered "just two sentences to convince the people."

Karbaschi argued that the interview was intended to undermine the president rather than facilitate meaningful communication with the public. 

"What we saw on TV was an honest president speaking transparently while facing unfairly challenging questions," he wrote.

The former mayor also accused the anchor of frequently interrupting Pezeshkian and raising provocative topics, such as a potential gasoline price hike, to derail his explanations of the administration’s performance.

Karbaschi further claimed that the president was given limited time to express his views on the controversial hijab law.

Domestic media appeared to express frustration upon realizing that the interview with Pezeshkian, his second since taking office on August 1, differed from those with previous presidents – when anchors typically refrained from challenging their guests and even assisted in portraying their performance in a favorable light. This was especially true in interviews with former President Ebrahim Raisi, much of the media noted.

Conservative columnist Abdoljavad Mousavi commented that "Pezeshkian spoke in the same manner about everything, making it difficult to assess his weaknesses and strengths," but argued that the president spoke with candor and honesty.

In contrast, Amir Hossein Jafari, a columnist for the pro-reform outlet Rouydad24, argued that Pezeshkian's remarks on various issues "hardly convinced the public."

Jafari highlighted key topics addressed in the interview, such as gasoline price hikes, internet censorship, and pressures stemming from the new compulsory hijab law.

"Apart from hijab, the president did not say much about other matters," he noted.

The word "disparity" dominated Pezeshkian's interview, reflecting gaps between the government’s financial resources and expenditures, production and consumption levels, and public expectations versus what the government can realistically deliver.

Throughout the conversation, Pezeshkian emphasized the lack of funding as a core issue. He acknowledged several economic challenges, many of which have escalated into crises, but maintained that there is little the government can do to address these disparities.

Pezeshkian offered no tangible solutions for short- or medium-term problems, instead suggesting measures that would only have been effective had they been implemented years ago.

He frequently remarked, especially regarding cultural issues, "Things should have been addressed when people were in primary school. It’s too late and too difficult to fix them now."

After the interview, Pezeshkian invited feedback on his X account. Many Iranians criticized his approach, calling him too timid.

"You should talk like a hammer!" one social media user urged.

Others expressed discontent over Pezeshkian’s perceived failure to uphold campaign promises, such as improving the economy, lifting internet censorship, and easing pressures on women over the hijab.

As one observer noted, "He has realized that things are not as easy as he thought when he made those promises during his campaign."

Q: Who oversees IRIB’s operations and leadership?

Established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, IRIB is the sole entity authorized to broadcast radio and television signals in Iran.

Under Iran’s Constitution, IRIB operates under the control of the supreme leader, who holds the authority to appoint and dismiss its head. The supreme leader's influence extends through his appointed representative within the organization.

The IRIB Supervisory Council, formed under Article 175 of the Constitution, includes representatives from the president and Parliament, each selecting two members. The chief justice, appointed by the supreme leader, selects two of the council's six members, further consolidating the supreme leader’s oversight.

Q: What are the sources of IRIB’s budget?

Unlike public service broadcasters in some other countries, such as the BBC, which is primarily funded through license fees and advertising, IRIB receives its budget from the government, supplemented by advertising revenue.

For the Iranian calendar year ending March 20, 2025, Parliament allocated 240 trillion rials (approximately $400 million) to IRIB. Despite an estimated $35 billion budget deficit, IRIB’s funding has consistently increased over the years, often surpassing inflation. This year’s allocation is three times higher than the previous year’s.

In addition to its main budget, IRIB receives separate funding for “cultural” activities and earns substantial revenue from advertising, amounting to trillions of rials annually.

IRIB is a vast organization employing between 30,000 and 50,000 people, significantly more than the BBC, which has around 21,000 employees.

Q: To which political factions are IRIB heads affiliated?

The IRIB is currently led by ultra-hardliners closely linked to the Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), both of which hold significant influence in Iran’s political system.

In 1987, shortly after becoming supreme leader, Ali Khamenei reinstated Mohammad Hashemi-Rafsanjani as the head of IRIB. Hashemi-Rafsanjani had been appointed by Khamenei’s predecessor, Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. He is also the brother of Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a prominent moderate conservative politician who played a key role in ensuring Khamenei succeeded Khomeini as supreme leader.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s tenure at IRIB ended in 1993. Since then, Khamenei has exclusively appointed leaders from the Principlist political camp, a coalition of conservative and ultra-hardline groups that dominate Iran’s right-wing politics.

Principlists have traditionally formed alliances against reformist politicians in elections. However, in the past decade, these alliances have narrowed, with many moderate conservatives—such as former President Hassan Rouhani and former Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who headed IRIB from 1994 to 2004—distancing themselves from hardliners and ultra-hardliners.

Q: Who is the current head of IRIB?

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Peyman Jebelli, a former head of IRIB’s foreign services, as the organization’s chief in 2021. Jebelli is politically aligned with Saeed Jalili, an ultra-hardline politician and former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who ran in the snap presidential elections of July 2021.

Jebelli appointed Vahid Jalili, Saeed Jalili’s brother, as his cultural deputy. In this role, Vahid Jalili wields significant influence over IRIB’s policy direction. He is also a member of the ultra-hardline Paydari (Steadfastness) Party, further consolidating the faction’s control over the state broadcaster.

Q: What foreign-language services does IRIB offer?

Press TV, launched in July 2007, is IRIB’s primary international channel, broadcasting in English.

In addition to Press TV, IRIB operates several channels targeting foreign audiences in multiple languages. These include Arabic-language channels such as Al-Alam, Al-Kawthar TV, and Al-Alam Syria; a Spanish-language channel, Hispan TV; and Hausa TV, which is aimed at West African audiences.

The IRIB also runs the Sahar Universal Network (SUN), launched in 1997, which broadcasts in languages including Dari, Azeri, Kurdish, Urdu, and Balkan languages such as Bosnian and Albanian.

The Jam-e Jam Network, which targeted Iranian expatriates and shared its name with the California-based opposition channel Jaam-e Jam that began broadcasting in 2015, ceased operations in 2023.

Q: Why has IRIB faced international sanctions?

IRIB has been sanctioned by multiple countries and organizations, including the United States and the European Union, for its role in censorship and human rights violations.

These sanctions cite IRIB’s broadcasting of forced confessions and its close ties to Iran’s security apparatus, which have been used to suppress dissent.

The current head of IRIB, Peyman Jebelli, is also under Western sanctions, including those by the US, for facilitating the suppression of free speech and using the media to support state violence.

Press TV, IRIB’s English-language outlet, has been sanctioned by the US and European entities for similar reasons.

Q: What is IRIB’s viewership?

IRIB’s viewership has significantly declined over the past two decades as many Iranians have turned to satellite TV channels, including banned Persian-language news and entertainment channels based abroad, instead of the national broadcaster.

IRIB officials claim that the organization retains a viewership of 72 percent. However, a survey by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), a government-affiliated polling body, reported a substantial drop, with only 12.5 percent of respondents identifying IRIB as their primary source of news, down from 51 percent in 2017. The same survey found that just 11.5 percent watch IRIB’s entertainment programs.

In recent years, IRIB’s monopoly has also been challenged by the rise of online entertainment platforms such as Filimo, which are gaining popularity among Iranian audiences.

Their accounts align with new data showing that Iran has reached its highest-ever divorce-to-marriage ratio.

Iran’s Open Data Center, which provides public access to government-generated data, reports that from March 20, 2023, to March 20, 2024, there were 2.4 marriages for every divorce recorded.

While there were just 481,000 marriages in that timeframe, reportedly the lowest in 27 years – divorces soared up to 202,000, marking the third-highest divorce count on record.

In the 1980s, the national divorce-to-marriage ratio was under 9 per 100 marriages. Since then, it has quadrupled, now approaching 40 divorces for every 100 marriages.

In light of the Iranian government’s crackdowns on individuals speaking to foreign media, some names have been abbreviated or last names omitted.

Professor K., a sociologist, told Iran International how financial instability has driven unprecedented pressure on marriages in Iran.

“When couples can’t afford rent or constantly fear eviction, the sense of security needed to nurture a relationship vanishes,” he said. “Young families feel trapped between rising inflation and unemployment. It’s tearing them apart.”

Trapped in Tehran's rising cost of living

The challenges faced by young couples are evident in the nation’s capital, where Narges and Ali say they once dreamed of buying a small apartment after their wedding.

Today the 29-year-olds have been married for three years and say they have noticed that with each year, rising prices push that dream further out of reach.

Ali told Iran International that they kept hoping the next year would bring some relief to their household finances.

"But after a while, it felt like living in limbo," he said.

In March, a report from state-controlled media indicated that nearly one in three Iranians is living below the poverty line, largely due to the high inflation experienced over the past five years.

At the same time, the government’s own statistics suggest that almost six out of every 10 Iranians are neither employed or seeking work – while more than half of those who are employed are often forced to hold down a side job to make ends meet.

Like many Iranian families, the financial challenges confronting Narges and Ali, have seeped into their personal lives.

“We were just existing,” Narges said. “He worked day and night, and so did I, but each time we saved a little, the rent would go up again. One day, I looked at him, and we both knew—we were just surviving. There was nothing left between us.”

While marriage is in decline, the country is simultaneously facing the threat of a fast-declining population growth rate.

Some studies suggest that by the year 2051, around 26 million of the country's population, or one-quarter of the population, will be elderly.

Despite several massive budget allocations to a regeneration scheme, fewer babies are born each year.

Iran’s government has set an ambitious target to raise the fertility rate to 2.5 by 2028, but critics say the state has not been able to boost the living standards, with more than 35% considered to be living under the absolute poverty line according to official statistics and many more living in increasing hardship despite having multiple jobs.

An examination of rental prices in the capital and the ongoing housing crisis highlights why many families have downsized, relocated to less desirable areas, or are living indefinitely with their parents, as is the case with Leila and her fiancé.

Like Narges and Ali, Leila and her partner say securing a place to live together remains a distant dream for them.

In Tehran, the monthly rent for a one-bedroom apartment in central districts has surged to over 250 million rials (approximately $400), whereas the average household income is around 150 million rials (about $220).

With a master’s degree in accounting, 27-year-old Leila told Iran International that her job prospects are limited, and her savings minimal.

“We’re both working, but after covering expenses, there’s hardly anything left to save,” she says.

Her mother, Farideh, shared, “When I was her age, I was already married, and we had our own place. Now the struggle is just to live, forget about a wedding or children.”

According to the latest data, Alborz province, located just north of Tehran, recorded a rate of 61 divorces for every 100 marriages. Other provinces in the region, including Mazandaran to the north, Tehran itself, Gilan to the northwest, Semnan to the east, and Markazi to the southwest, are also experiencing similar trends.

Economic strain delays marriage in traditional regions

In regions where traditional marriage norms remain strong, divorce rates are lower.

The latest statistics suggest that Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari recorded 30 divorces per 100 marriages and South Khorasan 27 – both closer to the national average.

Meanwhile, Sistan and Baluchestan recorded the lowest rate, with just 10 divorces per 100 marriages.

But, the economic strain in these regions appears to impact overall low marriage rates.

Despite its resource wealth, Sistan and Baluchestan face significant challenges, including underdevelopment and poverty. Reportedly the poorest province of Iran, it has a population of 4 million, which includes about 700,000 Afghan nationals.

Over the past years, the region has experienced many crises, including shortage of fuel, bread, and drinking water, as well as drought, widespread unemployment and increasing poverty.

Hossein, a shop owner in the provincial capital Zahedan, explained that poverty among the youth is fueling disillusionment.

“Young men used to marry in their early 20s. Now, they wait until they can support a family – but that day seems further and further away,” he told Iran International.

Mehri, a 32-year-old teacher and mother of two from Semnan, says she struggles daily with her family’s financial burdens.

Her husband, once an engineer, was laid off, and she says they are now forced to survive and live on her modest teaching salary.

“There’s no peace in our home anymore,” she told Iran International.

Sociologists, including Professor K., caution that the continued trend of low marriage rates could lead to broader social challenges, including increased isolation.

“Marriage has always been a cornerstone of stability in our culture,” said Professor K. “As more families fracture under economic pressures, we risk losing the community bonds that marriage has traditionally helped to strengthen.”

With economic pressures showing no signs of abating, experts say the disintegration of traditional marriage patterns over the last decades will lead to long-term challenges for Iran's social fabric.