Iran International
The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Iran's sole radio and television provider, faces international sanctions for human rights violations. Who controls IRIB, and how relevant is it in Iran today?
Q: Who oversees IRIB’s operations and leadership?
Established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, IRIB is the sole entity authorized to broadcast radio and television signals in Iran.
Under Iran’s Constitution, IRIB operates under the control of the supreme leader, who holds the authority to appoint and dismiss its head. The supreme leader's influence extends through his appointed representative within the organization.
The IRIB Supervisory Council, formed under Article 175 of the Constitution, includes representatives from the president and Parliament, each selecting two members. The chief justice, appointed by the supreme leader, selects two of the council's six members, further consolidating the supreme leader’s oversight.
Q: What are the sources of IRIB’s budget?
Unlike public service broadcasters in some other countries, such as the BBC, which is primarily funded through license fees and advertising, IRIB receives its budget from the government, supplemented by advertising revenue.
For the Iranian calendar year ending March 20, 2025, Parliament allocated 240 trillion rials (approximately $400 million) to IRIB. Despite an estimated $35 billion budget deficit, IRIB’s funding has consistently increased over the years, often surpassing inflation. This year’s allocation is three times higher than the previous year’s.
In addition to its main budget, IRIB receives separate funding for “cultural” activities and earns substantial revenue from advertising, amounting to trillions of rials annually.
IRIB is a vast organization employing between 30,000 and 50,000 people, significantly more than the BBC, which has around 21,000 employees.
Q: To which political factions are IRIB heads affiliated?
The IRIB is currently led by ultra-hardliners closely linked to the Paydari (Steadfastness) Party and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), both of which hold significant influence in Iran’s political system.
In 1987, shortly after becoming supreme leader, Ali Khamenei reinstated Mohammad Hashemi-Rafsanjani as the head of IRIB. Hashemi-Rafsanjani had been appointed by Khamenei’s predecessor, Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. He is also the brother of Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a prominent moderate conservative politician who played a key role in ensuring Khamenei succeeded Khomeini as supreme leader.
Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s tenure at IRIB ended in 1993. Since then, Khamenei has exclusively appointed leaders from the Principlist political camp, a coalition of conservative and ultra-hardline groups that dominate Iran’s right-wing politics.
Principlists have traditionally formed alliances against reformist politicians in elections. However, in the past decade, these alliances have narrowed, with many moderate conservatives—such as former President Hassan Rouhani and former Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who headed IRIB from 1994 to 2004—distancing themselves from hardliners and ultra-hardliners.
Q: Who is the current head of IRIB?
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Peyman Jebelli, a former head of IRIB’s foreign services, as the organization’s chief in 2021. Jebelli is politically aligned with Saeed Jalili, an ultra-hardline politician and former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who ran in the snap presidential elections of July 2021.
Jebelli appointed Vahid Jalili, Saeed Jalili’s brother, as his cultural deputy. In this role, Vahid Jalili wields significant influence over IRIB’s policy direction. He is also a member of the ultra-hardline Paydari (Steadfastness) Party, further consolidating the faction’s control over the state broadcaster.
Q: What foreign-language services does IRIB offer?
Press TV, launched in July 2007, is IRIB’s primary international channel, broadcasting in English.
In addition to Press TV, IRIB operates several channels targeting foreign audiences in multiple languages. These include Arabic-language channels such as Al-Alam, Al-Kawthar TV, and Al-Alam Syria; a Spanish-language channel, Hispan TV; and Hausa TV, which is aimed at West African audiences.
The IRIB also runs the Sahar Universal Network (SUN), launched in 1997, which broadcasts in languages including Dari, Azeri, Kurdish, Urdu, and Balkan languages such as Bosnian and Albanian.
The Jam-e Jam Network, which targeted Iranian expatriates and shared its name with the California-based opposition channel Jaam-e Jam that began broadcasting in 2015, ceased operations in 2023.
Q: Why has IRIB faced international sanctions?
IRIB has been sanctioned by multiple countries and organizations, including the United States and the European Union, for its role in censorship and human rights violations.
These sanctions cite IRIB’s broadcasting of forced confessions and its close ties to Iran’s security apparatus, which have been used to suppress dissent.
The current head of IRIB, Peyman Jebelli, is also under Western sanctions, including those by the US, for facilitating the suppression of free speech and using the media to support state violence.
Press TV, IRIB’s English-language outlet, has been sanctioned by the US and European entities for similar reasons.
Q: What is IRIB’s viewership?
IRIB’s viewership has significantly declined over the past two decades as many Iranians have turned to satellite TV channels, including banned Persian-language news and entertainment channels based abroad, instead of the national broadcaster.
IRIB officials claim that the organization retains a viewership of 72 percent. However, a survey by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), a government-affiliated polling body, reported a substantial drop, with only 12.5 percent of respondents identifying IRIB as their primary source of news, down from 51 percent in 2017. The same survey found that just 11.5 percent watch IRIB’s entertainment programs.
In recent years, IRIB’s monopoly has also been challenged by the rise of online entertainment platforms such as Filimo, which are gaining popularity among Iranian audiences.
Their accounts align with new data showing that Iran has reached its highest-ever divorce-to-marriage ratio.
Iran’s Open Data Center, which provides public access to government-generated data, reports that from March 20, 2023, to March 20, 2024, there were 2.4 marriages for every divorce recorded.
While there were just 481,000 marriages in that timeframe, reportedly the lowest in 27 years – divorces soared up to 202,000, marking the third-highest divorce count on record.
In the 1980s, the national divorce-to-marriage ratio was under 9 per 100 marriages. Since then, it has quadrupled, now approaching 40 divorces for every 100 marriages.
In light of the Iranian government’s crackdowns on individuals speaking to foreign media, some names have been abbreviated or last names omitted.
Professor K., a sociologist, told Iran International how financial instability has driven unprecedented pressure on marriages in Iran.
“When couples can’t afford rent or constantly fear eviction, the sense of security needed to nurture a relationship vanishes,” he said. “Young families feel trapped between rising inflation and unemployment. It’s tearing them apart.”
Trapped in Tehran's rising cost of living
The challenges faced by young couples are evident in the nation’s capital, where Narges and Ali say they once dreamed of buying a small apartment after their wedding.
Today the 29-year-olds have been married for three years and say they have noticed that with each year, rising prices push that dream further out of reach.
Ali told Iran International that they kept hoping the next year would bring some relief to their household finances.
"But after a while, it felt like living in limbo," he said.
In March, a report from state-controlled media indicated that nearly one in three Iranians is living below the poverty line, largely due to the high inflation experienced over the past five years.
At the same time, the government’s own statistics suggest that almost six out of every 10 Iranians are neither employed or seeking work – while more than half of those who are employed are often forced to hold down a side job to make ends meet.
Like many Iranian families, the financial challenges confronting Narges and Ali, have seeped into their personal lives.
“We were just existing,” Narges said. “He worked day and night, and so did I, but each time we saved a little, the rent would go up again. One day, I looked at him, and we both knew—we were just surviving. There was nothing left between us.”
While marriage is in decline, the country is simultaneously facing the threat of a fast-declining population growth rate.
Some studies suggest that by the year 2051, around 26 million of the country's population, or one-quarter of the population, will be elderly.
Despite several massive budget allocations to a regeneration scheme, fewer babies are born each year.
Iran’s government has set an ambitious target to raise the fertility rate to 2.5 by 2028, but critics say the state has not been able to boost the living standards, with more than 35% considered to be living under the absolute poverty line according to official statistics and many more living in increasing hardship despite having multiple jobs.
An examination of rental prices in the capital and the ongoing housing crisis highlights why many families have downsized, relocated to less desirable areas, or are living indefinitely with their parents, as is the case with Leila and her fiancé.
Like Narges and Ali, Leila and her partner say securing a place to live together remains a distant dream for them.
In Tehran, the monthly rent for a one-bedroom apartment in central districts has surged to over 250 million rials (approximately $400), whereas the average household income is around 150 million rials (about $220).
With a master’s degree in accounting, 27-year-old Leila told Iran International that her job prospects are limited, and her savings minimal.
“We’re both working, but after covering expenses, there’s hardly anything left to save,” she says.
Her mother, Farideh, shared, “When I was her age, I was already married, and we had our own place. Now the struggle is just to live, forget about a wedding or children.”
According to the latest data, Alborz province, located just north of Tehran, recorded a rate of 61 divorces for every 100 marriages. Other provinces in the region, including Mazandaran to the north, Tehran itself, Gilan to the northwest, Semnan to the east, and Markazi to the southwest, are also experiencing similar trends.
Economic strain delays marriage in traditional regions
In regions where traditional marriage norms remain strong, divorce rates are lower.
The latest statistics suggest that Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari recorded 30 divorces per 100 marriages and South Khorasan 27 – both closer to the national average.
Meanwhile, Sistan and Baluchestan recorded the lowest rate, with just 10 divorces per 100 marriages.
But, the economic strain in these regions appears to impact overall low marriage rates.
Despite its resource wealth, Sistan and Baluchestan face significant challenges, including underdevelopment and poverty. Reportedly the poorest province of Iran, it has a population of 4 million, which includes about 700,000 Afghan nationals.
Over the past years, the region has experienced many crises, including shortage of fuel, bread, and drinking water, as well as drought, widespread unemployment and increasing poverty.
Hossein, a shop owner in the provincial capital Zahedan, explained that poverty among the youth is fueling disillusionment.
“Young men used to marry in their early 20s. Now, they wait until they can support a family – but that day seems further and further away,” he told Iran International.
Mehri, a 32-year-old teacher and mother of two from Semnan, says she struggles daily with her family’s financial burdens.
Her husband, once an engineer, was laid off, and she says they are now forced to survive and live on her modest teaching salary.
“There’s no peace in our home anymore,” she told Iran International.
Sociologists, including Professor K., caution that the continued trend of low marriage rates could lead to broader social challenges, including increased isolation.
“Marriage has always been a cornerstone of stability in our culture,” said Professor K. “As more families fracture under economic pressures, we risk losing the community bonds that marriage has traditionally helped to strengthen.”
With economic pressures showing no signs of abating, experts say the disintegration of traditional marriage patterns over the last decades will lead to long-term challenges for Iran's social fabric.
In a televised address, Masoud Pezeshkian admitted that in spite of promises that prices would not rise and that there would be no foreign exchange allocated for gasoline imports, it was a necessary means to manage in the worst recession since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979.
"When the allocation of foreign exchange is not compensated, gasoline prices will inevitably rise," he said.
He highlighted the financial strain posed by gasoline imports, citing a potential budget deficit that would harm low-income groups through inflation, referring to a shortage of foreign currency earnings that limit the government's ability to finance imports.
In the past six years, since the United States re-introduced oil export sanctions, the government has been forced to print more money that has pushed annual inflation to above 40%.
“When we allocate dollars to import gasoline, it leads to a budget deficit, resulting in inflation that harms low-income groups. By doing this, we exert pressure on them,” he added.
On Tuesday, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Parliament, countered by asserting that pricing petroleum products is the government’s responsibility.
“Let the government do its job, and we will not interfere,” he added.
The debate occurs while there are broader concerns over Iran's "energy imbalance," a term Pezeshkian used to describe the country's shortages in gas, electricity, and water.
During the interview on Monday, he stressed that unsustainable energy consumption, coupled with heavy subsidies amounting to $130-$150 billion annually, burdens the economy.
“This equates to 900 million rials [$1,300] per capita,” he said, emphasizing the incompatibility of current energy needs with production capacity.
Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati also echoed concerns about shortages on Tuesday, pointing to rampant gasoline smuggling and the financial toll of imports.
Speaking at an insurance conference, Hemmati said: "Whenever we discuss this, people say we intend to increase gasoline prices. No logic accepts this massive gasoline smuggling while we are forced to import gasoline ourselves.
"As long as I am the Minister of Economy..., I will do my utmost to combat these rent-seeking practices. It is time for reforms. We must address the imbalances once and for all."
The potential for a gasoline price hike has sparked discussions ahead of next year’s budget approval, with parliament members divided. Some warned that such a move could provoke political unrest, reminiscent of the November 2019 protests following steep price increases during Hassan Rouhani's presidency.
Pezeshkian has consistently highlighted energy shortages, particularly around gasoline. His remarks that $5 billion is spent annually on imports contrast with figures from Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the IRGC, which said last year’s total was $2 billion.