Iran International
The details of Iran's new hijab law, unveiled by media in Tehran on Saturday, including stricter measures and the potential rise of vigilantism, have deeply unsettled many Iranians.
The full text of the legislation, recently disclosed to the public, has unveiled previously hidden provisions, including requirements to establish "popular" groups tasked with issuing verbal and written warnings to individuals who fail to comply with the new law.
In recent days, some social media users and anti-immigrant activists have launched campaigns opposing the exemption in the new law that allows "foreign nationals with official residence documents" to bypass the Iranian citizenship requirement for joining these "popular" groups.
Iranian officials always refer to millions of Afghan immigrants who live in Iran as “foreign nationals”.
Under the Iranian government's interpretation of Islamic practice, "popular" groups or religious individuals are authorized to intervene in public spaces and urge citizens to comply with hijab regulations.
Anti-Afghan immigration activists argue that the exemption made in the hijab law will allow Afghan immigrants with ties to the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) to form vigilante groups to harass women for hijab.
Such concerns are exacerbated by the history of the IRGC’s recruitment of Shia Afghans to fight alongside Iranian forces in Syria during the Syrian civil war.
Diaspora activist Elham Omidvari criticized the emphasis on permitting “foreign nationals” to issue hijab warnings to Iranians in a tweet on Sunday. She argued that the hijab law should be opposed in its entirety, as it fundamentally violates the basic human rights of Iranian women.
Lawmakers deliberately included a clause to allow “foreign nationals” to warn women for hijab to "divert people’s attention from the other tragedies" stipulated in the hijab laws, another diaspora activist Hatef Motahhary argued in a tweet.
“As if now the women’s problem is whether it is an Afghan or a Basij militia member who will warn them for hijab!” he wrote.
The new law has criminalized “encouragement” to defiance of hijab rules, as well as “derision and insults” to women for wearing it.
Such offenses will be punishable by cash fines, refusal of an exit permit to leave the country, a ban of six months to two years on social media activity, a prison sentence of two to six years, or 74 lashes.
Tens of viewers have responded to Iran International TV’s inquiry about how they expect the hijab law to affect their lives. Many of them have said Iranians will continue civil disobedience and refuse to abide by the hijab law despite the cash fines, prison sentences, and deprivation from services that the government should provide to them.
The Guardian Council approved the hijab law in mid-September. Typically, such legislation would be officially communicated to all government agencies by the president within a few days for implementation. However, President Masoud Pezeshkian has neither taken this step nor made any public comments on the matter.
If Pezeshkian fails to communicate the law, the onus will be on Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf who said a few days ago that the process of the public announcement and enforcement of the highly controversial legislation was delayed for “security reasons related to the anniversary of the 2022 [protests]”.
The protests that lasted several months and spread across the country were sparked by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of morality police in September 2022.
Pezeshkian’s supporters insist that he should refuse to communicate the hijab law because he made a promise to Iranians not to let women be harassed for hijab.
“Mr. President, the hijab law is a banana peel for your government—one that could cause its downfall,” Amir Tanha, a prominent social media activist with a large following on X, tweeted on Saturday. “By endorsing it, you will only pit yourself and your government against the very people who voted for you. Let the Parliament take responsibility for communicating this flawed law,” he added.
A notable example of such remarks is former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statement advocating for "wiping Israel off the map." Many believe this comment significantly escalated hostility between Iran and Israel, though it was rooted in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s stance toward the Jewish state.
Ahmadinejad is also known for dismissive remarks about the significance of UN resolutions against the Islamic Republic, which ultimately led to economic sanctions that severely affected Iranians' livelihoods for nearly 15 years.
Former reformist lawmaker Mohsen Mirdamadi has emphasized that Iranian officials must refrain from making such statements to support and advance diplomatic efforts with the West.
Although some Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, do not have official spokespersons, Iranian media often publish statements by lower-ranking officials that can undermine state affairs and disrupt the leadership's plans for advancing their agenda.
The absence of an official spokesperson for Khamenei recently sparked controversy in the Iranian parliament over whether Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif should be dismissed, as demanded by his ultraconservative lawmakers. Earlier, Mehdi Fazaeli, a senior official in Khamenei's office, quoted the Supreme Leader as opposing challenges to Zarif's qualifications. However, ultraconservatives argued that Fazaeli was not an authorized spokesperson for Khamenei, casting doubt on the statement's credibility.
In 2018, the Iranian government under former President Hassan Rouhani went without a spokesperson for 179 days—just one day short of six months. At the time, the conservative Mehr news agency sharply criticized Rouhani, claiming that his failure to appoint a spokesperson signaled an unwillingness to be accountable to public opinion.
However, it is not clear is certain provocative statements are the result of bad judgement or are designed to give mixed signals to both the Iranian public and foreign audiences.
In a recent example of issuing statements seemingly at odds with the government's broader policies, Iran's nuclear chief, Mohammad Eslami, announced, "We have begun injecting gas into several thousand advanced centrifuges, which is part of the nuclear industry's development program, and have put them into operational circuits." This remark appeared to disregard the fact that it directly contradicted a recent IAEA resolution condemning Tehran for violating its international obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal, and the government’s declarations that does not seek nuclear weapons.
The statement was made two days before a meeting with the United Kingdom, France and Germany to reduce the tensions between Tehran and European powers.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has an official public relations office led by a chief who acts as a spokesperson. However, various commanders frequently make incendiary statements that do not necessarily align with the policies of the government or the IRGC itself. In recent months, while Khamenei has occasionally been cautious to avoid provoking Israel or the West, IRGC officers have repeatedly issued threats. At times, total news blackouts on military or nuclear issues suggest that orders for silence may have come from higher authorities. Yet, these periods of quiet are often short-lived, as outspoken officers tend to make remarks at any moment.
In an interview, Mirdamadi emphasized that Iranian officials and military commanders should refrain from making costly remarks, particularly on foreign policy matters. He stated, "They often chant impractical slogans, leaving the nation to bear the heavy consequences of mistakes it did not commit. In the recent incident leading up to the IAEA resolution, some politicians made unnecessary but highly damaging statements."
Mirdamadi was referring to remarks like the one made by former deputy judiciary chief Mohammad Javad Larijani who suggested that Iran can make a nuclear bomb in 24 hours.
Mirdamadi also criticized Iran's approach, stating, "We should neither underestimate nor overrate the country's capabilities. We need to be realistic and recognize that Iran cannot singlehandedly change the world order. There are matters beyond Iran's power or authority, and it is not in our interest to define the country's priorities in a way that necessitates confrontation with other nations, particularly major powers."
Ironically, Mirdamadi himself was one of the leaders of the Iranian students who occupied the US embassy in Tehran in 1979, holding over 50 American diplomats hostage for 444 days, an incident that set the country on its course of foreign confrontations.
Opposition forces have now advanced towards the outskirts of Hama and Homs, two strategic Syrian cities on the road to Damascus. The potential fall of Damascus and the overthrow of the Assad government is more serious than ever, causing deep concerns for the Islamic Republic and its leader, Ali Khamenei.
The collapse of Assad’s rule would dismantle a cornerstone of Iran’s regional strategy against Israel. It would also threaten the survival of Iran's proxy groups, which rely heavily on Damascus for support. Without Assad’s backing, these groups could struggle to sustain their operations, jeopardizing the Islamic Republic’s influence in the region.
For Khamenei and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), Assad’s government is a vital pillar of the so-called Axis of Resistance. Its potential fall could even endanger the stability of the Islamic Republic itself.
The coming days are pivotal for both Assad’s government and Iran. The defeat in Aleppo dealt a major blow to the morale of the Syrian army and government, but the greater concern for Assad and the Islamic Republic is the possibility of opposition forces advancing toward Damascus after consolidating their power in the north and toppling the government.
The opposition forces now control Aleppo and Idlib near Turkey’s borders and are rapidly advancing in Hama and Homs governorates with reports that they are at the gates of the provincial capitals. Capturing the cities of Hama and Homs would give them a strategic advantage, potentially allowing a push toward Latakia, the Assad family’s power base, or Damascus.
The situation today is starkly different from 2016, when Assad, with robust support from Russia, Hezbollah, and Iran, defeated opposition forces in the battle of Aleppo. Several factors have contributed to the weakening of the Assad government and its supporters:
- Russia's involvement in Ukraine: Russia, a key ally of Damascus, is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, limiting its ability to provide military support compared to 2016.
- Hezbollah's diminished sway: Iran-backed Hezbollah, a powerful armed ally of Damascus, has suffered significant losses in its conflict with Israel and faces domestic pressure in Lebanon to reduce its involvement in regional conflicts.
- Iran's economic constraints: Tehran’s financial woes made worse by US sanctions have restricted its ability to provide financial and military aid to the Assad government. According to estimates, Tehran has spent tens of billions of dollars in Syria but now finds it hard to continue such support.
- Erosion of the IRGC's manpower and logistics in Syria: Key IRGC commanders, including former chief of IRG's extraterritorial Quds Force Qasem Soleimani, have been killed in recent years and the replacement forces do not have the same capabilities. Additionally, proxy groups such as the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are less effective than before.
If Assad’s falls, Iran’s regional foreign policy could face a severe crisis. Damascus plays a crucial role in facilitating the transport of weapons, logistics, and financial support to Iran’s proxy groups. Its collapse would likely lead to:
- Disruption of weapons transfers to Hezbollah via Damascus and Latakia airports.
- Reduced support for Palestinian groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.
- Destruction of smuggling networks for arms and narcotics into Jordan and the West Bank.
For Iran, preserving Assad's government is a matter of strategic survival. While Khamenei and the IRGC are likely to make every effort to prevent its collapse, their resources and influence are far weaker than in the past. Ultimately, Assad’s fall could dismantle the 'Axis of Resistance’ and pose a serious threat to the Islamic Republic’s future.
Speaking after a closed-door meeting between the government and members of the parliament, Masoud Pezeshkian told lawmakers, “Our need for you to continue on this path is far greater than what has been done so far,” emphasizing that overcoming the shortages in the energy sector required both government and popular cooperation.
The call comes as Iran grapples with widespread power outages, rising fuel prices, and a looming fiscal crisis.
While Pezeshkian stopped short of directly referencing potential increases in fuel prices, his remarks suggest an acknowledgment of the urgency of the situation.
The government’s longstanding narrative, which places the blame for the energy crisis on the people’s excessive consumption, has increasingly fallen flat in the face of growing public frustration.
Calls for citizens to conserve energy have become a familiar refrain, but many Iranians are growing skeptical of these appeals, seeing them as an excuse for government inaction rather than a solution.
In September, Hassanali Taghizadeh, chairman of the Iran Electrical Industry Syndicate, dismissed claims of excessively high domestic electricity consumption, saying that Iranian households use roughly half the electricity per capita compared to European households.
"Don't blame the people. Don't falsely claim that people's consumption is high. The average per capita consumption of Iranians is 1,220 kilowatt-hours per year, while in Europe it is 2,120 kilowatt-hours," he said. According to Eurostat, the electricity consumption per capita in the household sector in the EU in 2022 was 1,584 kWh,” he said.
In his speech, Pezeshkian addressed the escalating energy shortages, claiming that they could only be corrected with the collaboration of both parliament and the people.
His rhetoric, however, appeared detached from the reality of the situation, as citizens continue to face power outages, unreliable energy supplies, and skyrocketing living costs.
The energy crisis is compounded by a widening fiscal gap, with the next year’s national budget projected to have a deficit exceeding $30 billion, or more than 30% of total expenditures.
While Pezeshkian briefly addressed the fiscal challenges in his remarks, much of the meeting appeared to be consumed by speeches and vague declarations, rather than solutions.
The government's repeated calls for the people’s help seem more like an attempt to deflect responsibility than an invitation for meaningful dialogue on energy policy reform. Other officials and commentators have argued that Iran has failed to make the necessary investments in oil, natural gas and electricity production and upkeep of the grid.
The potential increase in fuel prices, which has sparked considerable controversy in parliament, was also a central topic of discussion. Some lawmakers expressed strong opposition to the proposed hikes, warning that they could ignite political unrest, much like the 2019 protests that followed a sudden increase in fuel prices.
Adding to the skepticism surrounding Pezeshkian’s remarks, the government’s claim that Iran spends billions annually on fuel imports has been called into question.
Pezeshkian said that the country imports $5 billion worth of fuel each year, but state-run news outlets, including the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, disputed this figure, saying that only $2 billion worth of fuel was imported in the past year.
Meanwhile, the country’s chronic problem of fuel smuggling continues to undermine the government’s narrative.
Economist Mousa Ghaninejad recently said that an estimated 50 million liters of gasoline are being illegally exported from Iran every day—far more than previous estimates of 20 million liters. Ghaninejad’s figures point to a much larger and more organized network of smuggling, suggesting that the problem is not confined to small-scale operators along the borders, as the government has often said.
As Iran heads into the new year with a deepening energy crisis and growing political tensions, the question remains whether the government can move beyond speeches to implement meaningful reforms.