Canada moves to deport suspected Iranian official - Global News

"Those who oppose Iran's joining the Financial Action Task Force are profiteers of sanctions and Iran's isolation and want to benefit from this isolation for themselves," he told ISNA in an interview published on Thursday.

He argued that claims that joining FATF would hinder oil sales are unfounded. "The claim that some individuals make, that joining FATF will make it impossible for us to sell oil, is an incorrect justification; because the whole world knows who our oil buyers are."

"Not joining FATF and selling oil through unofficial channels causes about 30% of the proceeds from exports to go into the pockets of intermediaries,” he added.

Ghanbari pointed out that out of 200 countries, only three—Iran, North Korea, and Myanmar—remain outside of FATF. "Even Russia, which has political and commercial relations with us, says join FATF, and if you do not do this, we cannot have economic and commercial exchanges with you," he added.

He expressed hope the Expediency Discernment Council would support FATF membership, which he said has traditionally had negative views about the organization.

The Expediency Discernment Council, which mediates disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council (a constitutional watchdog), became involved after parliament approved the legislation but the Guardian Council rejected the two bills concerning the Palermo and CFT conventions regulating money laundering and financing of terror groups.

Last month, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved revisiting the two critical international conventions required to ease banking restrictions resulting from Iran's blacklisting by the FATF.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), established by the G7 member countries to safeguard the international financial system, influences banking policies in most countries and guides businesses aiming to protect their own integrity and reputations.

Iran's status on the FATF blacklist has had a major impact on its international banking operations. The country remains on the list of high-risk countries with serious strategic deficiencies in countering money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.

Iran needs to finalize legislation enabling the enactment of two international conventions: the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention).

The dispute between the parliament and the Guardian Council was referred to the Expediency Council in 2019 for arbitration.

The Expediency Discernment Council, which mediates disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council (a constitutional watchdog), became involved after parliament approved the legislation but the Guardian Council rejected the two bills concerning the Palermo and CFT conventions regulating money laundering and financing of terror groups.

The Expediency Council has stalled the matter since then, neither approving nor rejecting the bills. The inaction is apparently due to objections from hardliners, such as the Chairman of the Expediency Council Sadeq Amoli Larijani.

They argue that joining the conventions would harm Iran's national security by exposing its dealings with regional Tehran-backed allies—precisely the activities these international agreements are designed to address.

Iran will remain on the FATF's list of High-Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action until it fully implements its action plan, including ratifying the Palermo and CFT. Only then will the FATF consider next steps, such as suspending countermeasures.

According to SedayeMiras, a website specializing in Iranian cultural heritage, the gold artifacts, originally priced at $3 million, were sold for just $1.1m to two Afghan men.

“The two brothers named Davoodshah and Ahmadshah are part of a group called the Afghan Brothers Gang in the world of artifact smuggling.

"They obtained the stolen treasures in Dubai after they were taken out of Iran by Iranian smugglers,” said the news outlet that covers Iran’s cultural heritage.

The stolen artifacts include a gold pendant depicting Darius I, its heavy gold chain, two ornate gold armlets, a set of Achaemenid-era women's jewelry, and a 2,500-year-old gold diadem.

Despite the scale of the theft mentioned by SedayeMiras, Iran’s Cultural Heritage Organization has yet to comment.

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran's government has focused on the promotion of Islamic culture and values, taking a conservative stance on ancient relics predating Islam.

Countless historical sites and artifacts have since suffered from neglect, inadequate maintenance and protection, and the impact of environmental damage.

The Statistical Center of Iran recently reported only a 2% increase in the retail price of cooking oil since last year, whereas market data indicate it jumped by 15%. A similar discrepancy also lies in many other core commodities.

The latest government statistics were released in a report on Wednesday called Average Prices of Selected Food Items in Urban Areas - December 2024.

But analysis of 15 household items by Iran International reveals significant differences between market expectations and government statistics.

The price of My Baby diapers has doubled since September and increased by 140% from February 2024.

The report also shows that the price of imported rice increased by about 22% in December 2024 compared to the previous year.

Iran International also found out that a 10-kg bag of Pakistani rice, worth 6.5 million rials ($7.7) in February 2024, is now selling for about 17.5 million rials ($20.8), up almost 170%.

The same pattern appears in meat prices. Lamb has risen by 27% in the past year, according to the official statistics while the 2025 market prices show an 81% year-on-year rise.

Since 2018, when the US re-imposed economic sanctions under the maximum pressure policy, Iranian currency has dropped nearly 20-fold. In the last five months alone, the rial has lost a further 30% of its value.

On Thursday, every US dollar was exchanged for 840,000 rials in the market.

Over one third of Iranians are now living below the poverty line amid the worst economic crisis since the founding of the Islamic Republic.

Since the crisis kicked in back in 2022, it has led to many Iranians bartering for food items.

This week, in a bid to stabilize soaring potato prices, Iran is now importing 50,000 tons of potatoes, according to the country's deputy agricultural minister.

They will be sold at a target price of about 30 US cents per kilogram, less than half of the current market prices, Akbar Fat’hi said on Wednesday.

In a speech in Tehran on Tuesday, Khamenei warned Iran’s officialdom of Washington’s hidden agendas without dismissing talks entirely.

This is characteristic of his rule. He opposes US policies while keeping the door open for engagement under certain conditions. The aim is clear: to manage internal factions and external pressures without committing to a clear course of action

But would this work with President Donald Trump and his expected ramping up of economic and political pressure?

Khamenei’s approach appears rooted in what his supporters call strategic patience. But it may be better framed as noncommittal interference.

By neither fully rejecting nor embracing negotiations, he hedges his bets, leaving room to say “I told you so,” regardless of the outcome.

This approach has more often than not allowed the Islamic Republic to navigate geopolitical pressures while preserving its core interests. Khamenei's hope is to deter aggressive US policies and mitigate domestic instability without making significant concessions.

Iran’s response to Trump’s hard line

The Trump administration is expected to revive the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, aiming to force Tehran to negotiate under terms favorable to Washington. This stands in contrast to Joe Biden’s more moderate policy of non-aggravation.

Trump has explicitly said that his primary goal is to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, citing the country’s short breakout time.

There are signs, however, that he might adopt a softer tone to encourage dialogue. The absence of US reports on Iran’s human rights violations at a UN Human Rights Council meeting last week could be a case in point.

That said, it seems unlikely that Trump would abandon his core strategy of cutting off Iran’s oil revenues, particularly by managing China’s demand for Iranian crude.

Anticipating what may lie ahead—already facing an ailing economy and regional setbacks— Iran’s ruling elite appears to have adopted a defensive strategy.

Tehran’s most recent military exercise focused on deterrence capabilities—a readiness to counter foreign threats, according to General Hossein Salami, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Seeing its regional influence undermined by last year’s events in Syria and Lebanon, the leadership in Tehran is now focused on preserving domestic stability and managing international relations without escalating conflicts.

The fact that the promised retaliation against Israel’s November attack, dubbed True Promise 3, has not materialized could indicate Tehran’s wish to avoid further escalation.

In his speech on Tuesday, Khamenei invoked a Quranic verse: “And do not weaken, and do not grieve, for you will surely be superior if you are believers.”

It was yet another attempt to raise spirit and resilience among supporters of his theocratic rule, framing perseverance as a religious and strategic necessity.

Negotiations and future prospects

Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian and senior members of his administration have signaled a willingness to negotiate with the Trump administration.

However, their conditions for talks appear unrealistic, reflecting internal disagreements and strategic calculations.

The dominant faction within the Islamic Republic publicly expresses reluctance to engage with Trump, citing distrust in Washington’s intentions and concerns over regional allies.

An implicit nod from the supreme leader, coated in notions of expediency or necessity, could override all such hesitations, of course, as demonstrated by the talks that led to Iran’s nuclear deal in 2015.

A defensive drill like the most recent Great Prophet 19 may be presented as a show of commitment to regional security. It may only aim to deter foreign aggression. But it inexorably leads to more tensions in the Middle East and more concern in the capitals of Arab countries around the Persian Gulf.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a proven record of an ability to adapt under existential threats. In 2025, that adaptation may require Khamenei giving in to Trump’s demands—an overly optimistic proposition.

Khamenei’s strategy hinges on delaying negotiations, forming alliances, and enhancing domestic capabilities to withstand sanctions. The objective would be to get to a time and place where his representatives can negotiate with a better hand, accepting the risks of prolonged economic hardship and regional isolation.

Predicting the trajectory of Tehran-Washington relations is challenging given the secrecy and complexity of domestic and geopolitical dynamics.

Iran is not Trump’s top priority, as far as can be surmised from his first ten days in office. He has confirmed that he is seeking a deal.

But would he have the patience that Khamenei seeks?

The Swedish TV channel, TV4 Nyheterna, reported on Tuesday that Rouzbeh Parsi, the head of the Middle East program at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), communicated with authorities in Tehran who actively sought to amplify official Iranian foreign policy talking points in Western policy circles.

The discussions, TV4 reported, aimed to shape Western perceptions of Iran during critical nuclear negotiations.

TV4 said Parsi had held meetings with Iranian diplomats, including former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and worked alongside senior figures who were closely affiliated with the IRGC.

In 2023, a joint investigative report by Iran International and Semafor combed through thousands of emails from Iranian diplomats, revealing a network of academics and think tank analysts cultivated by Iran's foreign ministry to extend Tehran's soft power.

Members of the grouping, called the Iran Experts Initiative (IEI), were guided by Iran's Foreign Ministry in their public writing and media appearances. They were key voices in Western think tanks and policy institutions helping promote Iran's stances.

Parsi, listed in the leaked emails as an IEI member, attended its inaugural meeting in May 2014 at Vienna’s Palais Coburg hotel, coinciding with nuclear talks. Documents indicate that Iran’s foreign ministry covered the event’s costs.

While Parsi acknowledges his participation, he denies collaborating with Tehran.

“My purpose was to observe how Iranian officials reason and act in real-time,” he told TV4.

The leaked emails revealed that IEI members, including prominent Iranian-American scholars like Ali Vaez and Ariane Tabatabai, published articles supporting official Iranian positions.

In a 2015 email to Iranian officials, Khatibzadeh, a senior Iranian diplomat who helped mastermind the IEI, referred to participants as “our friends” and shared links to their work which aligned with Iran’s narrative on nuclear negotiations.

Khatibzadeh was appointed on Saturday as the head of the foreign ministry's think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS).

The IEI’s activities have drawn scrutiny, particularly regarding figures like Tabatabai, who held senior positions within the US Department of Defense.