Research Fellow, Baker Institute
As conflict between Tehran and Washington escalates and war lowers over the horizon, "de-risking" has become a mantra in Arab capitals astride the Persian Gulf.
Tensions between Iran and the United States have risen sharply since Donald Trump re-entered the Oval Office on 20 January, presenting multiple risks of escalation.
A key deadline in October 2025 looms over whether European countries will trigger the snapback mechanism to re-impose United Nations sanctions removed as part of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.
Indications, not least by President Trump himself, that he would like to negotiate a new agreement to address Iran’s rapidly-advancing nuclear program, have been offset by his administration’s restoration of its ‘maximum pressure’ policy on Iran.
Trump’s transactional nature and unconventional style of decision-making means nothing can be ruled out in a high-stakes confrontation without a clearly-defined plan.
Caught in the middle are Iran's Arab neighbours, where large-scale projects aimed at future-proofing economic development and growing non-oil sectors would be jeopardized by any conflict involving Iran.
‘De-risking’ has become a mantra in Arab capitals and particularly in Riyadh as the landmark year of 2030 draws closer and as the ‘giga-projects’ associated with Vision 2030 move into construction and delivery phases.
Qatar this month called for a diplomatic solution to the US-Iran standoff over Tehran's nuclear program and argued against military action.
The desire to reduce exposure to regional volatility has been evident in the process of rapprochement with Iran since 2020, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait restoring full diplomatic ties with Tehran in 2022 and 2023 and maintaining regular dialogue on key issues of interest.
This was evident in regional responses to the war in Gaza after 7 October 2023 as the conflict did not regionalize, in part because there was little appetite in any capital on either side of the Persian Gulf for any escalation.
Excluded once, not twice
Back in 2015, officials in some Arab capitals and also in Israel expressed frustration that they were not included in the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 that culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from which Trump’s first administration withdrew in 2018.
In 2020, Saudi leaders called on the incoming Biden administration to consult with them as it sought to revive the Iran deal and explore an expanded ‘follow-on’ agreement, which ultimately did not happen.
As the indirect talks between US and Iranian officials broke down in 2022, the role of Iran's neighbouring Arab countries became more central to keeping open channels of communication between the parties.
Oman and Qatar, along with Kuwait, have long played roles in diplomacy and mediation in regional affairs, as they generally maintained pragmatic working relationships with Iran which, in the Qatari case, included one of the world’s largest reservoirs of natural gas which straddled their maritime boundary.
Officials in Oman placed a premium on balancing relationships with regional partners and being able to utilize their ability to engage with adversaries to address flashpoints and minimize their threat to regional security.
Prior to their passing in 2020, both Sultan Qaboos of Oman and Emir Sabah of Kuwait had well-earned reputations as diplomatists par excellence borne out of decades of involvement in regional affairs.
An example of their efforts to reduce tensions was seen in early 2017 when Emir Sabah sent a letter to Iran’s then-president, Hasan Rouhani, to establish a basis for dialogue after tensions had soared in 2016. Rouhani responded by visiting Kuwait and Oman and Emir Sabah then traveled to Muscat to meet with Sultan Qaboos to follow up, but the subsequent rift over Qatar put paid to those efforts.
In 2025, Kuwait is focused on domestic issues and relatively absent from the regional scene, but there is space for Saudi Arabia to play more of an active role than it has in the past and to build upon the progress in the Kingdom’s relations with Iran since ties were re-established two years ago.
Since 2023, the Saudi leadership has been active in regional diplomatic initiatives concerning Syria, Gaza, and Sudan, and has burnished its credentials as an intermediary with convening power across the Arab and Islamic worlds.
In its ongoing facilitation of meetings of Ukrainian, Russian, and U.S. officials, the Kingdom has shown that it has the ability to navigate between adversaries and leverage its growing non-alignment in world affairs.
Securing a seat at the table in the Russia-U.S. talks may be a prelude to inserting Saudi Arabia into the middle of any negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, thereby minimizing the risks of exclusion from the talks, as in 2015, but Iranian officials may still view the Saudis as too close to the U.S. and not impartial.
The regional mediators of longer standing, Qatar and Oman, are likely to continue to offer their services in relaying messages between the Unites States and Iran and ensuring that opportunities for dialogue remain open, joined by the United Arab Emirates which delivered a letter from Trump to Iranian leaders on 12 March.
Trump redux
Trump’s mercurial approach to policy appears even more unpredictable second time around and has led to whipsaw decisions on tariffs that have added to market uncertainty and left analysts scrambling.
A similar pattern may well overshadow the next phase of the delicate dance between the U.S. and Iran, especially if Trump and Iranian leaders engage in verbal sparring matches of ever-increasing volume.
If this happens, officials in the Gulf States may focus on practical measures to limit the possibility of escalation, whether by accident or design, and identify the parameters of realistic dialogue going forward.
Taken together, their efforts are illustrative of the prevailing opinion in the region in favor of resolving the standoff between Tehran and Washington, and the depth of Emirati (and Saudi) political and economic relationships in DC may resonate with the Trump White House and its Congressional allies.
While tensions in other parts of the Middle East have soared in the wake of the Gaza war and the degradation of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance,’ the rulers in Riyadh, Muscat or Abu Dhabi are more closely aligned than they were in Trump’s first term, and may thus be better placed to play a proactive and productive role in de-escalatory regional dynamics.
