Confidence or caution? Iran's oil fleet stops hiding

Lawmakers rejected the motion with 150 votes in favor, 73 against and nine abstentions out of 238 members present, Tasnim said. The proposal was sent to parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee for further review.

The bill was introduced by conservative lawmakers seeking to block implementation of Iran’s conditional approval to join the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, one of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards that require countries to monitor and report financial transactions to curb money laundering and terror funding.

Earlier this month, Iran’s Expediency Council, which resolves disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, gave conditional approval for joining the treaty after years of delay. The council said implementation would depend on guarantees that Iran’s economic and security interests would not be compromised.

Hardline lawmakers argue that joining the convention could expose Iran’s financial channels used to bypass US sanctions and support regional allies such as Hezbollah and armed groups in Iraq and Yemen. They say Iran should only join once all sanctions are lifted.

Supporters of the treaty, including some moderate lawmakers and economic officials, argue that compliance with FATF standards could help reconnect Iran’s banking system to global financial networks and attract foreign investment amid a severe economic downturn.

Trump told Israeli lawmakers on Monday that “it would be great if we made a peace deal with them,” adding later that Iran “has been battered and bruised” by US sanctions and “will come along” to talks. “I’d love to take the sanctions off when they’re ready to talk,” he said.

In June, the United States joined Israel in a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear sites after months of indirect talks stalled over enrichment and inspection terms. The attacks destroyed parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and killed scientists and soldiers, according to Iranian officials.

Iran dismissed Trump’s remarks, saying they were “in complete contradiction” with US behavior. “How can one speak of peace while attacking residential areas and peaceful nuclear facilities of a country and killing innocent people?” the ministry said on Tuesday in a statement carried by Iranian media.

Tehran said US support for Israel and its obstruction of UN measures on Gaza showed that Washington’s talk of peace was insincere. It accused the United States of complicity in what it called Israel’s “war crimes” in the enclave.

The ministry said Iranians would never forgive the 2020 US drone strike that killed Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, describing him as a national hero who led the fight against Islamic State militants.

Trump said on Monday that Iran “cannot survive” under current sanctions but that he hoped Tehran would “want to get back into the world of good economies.” He said the US-led strikes in June had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program and that the country “won’t go back into the nuclear world again.”

Iran said its nuclear program was peaceful and that repeated US accusations were aimed at justifying aggression. It said Washington’s “admission of crimes” only deepened its responsibility for regional instability.

Trump reinstated sweeping sanctions on Iran in January, reviving his “maximum pressure” policy. Tehran says US sanctions violate international law and that Washington must first change its conduct before any negotiations can begin.

“We always bring Jared when we want to get that deal closed … Steve, you and Jared and the general and Pete and Marco — you’ll get that deal done,” Trump said moments after discussing Iran’s nuclear program and its role in the Middle East.

The line was brief but telling.

For analysts who have followed Trump’s unconventional diplomacy, it echoed the playbook that produced the Abraham Accords — a blend of personal trust, transactional bargaining and Kushner’s unique access to Persian Gulf capitals.

Kushner has already hinted at his own views on Iran in the past. In a post on X in September 2024, he called the day Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s was assassinated by Israel “the most important day in the Middle East since the Abraham Accords.”

Kushner wrote on X that Iran was “now fully exposed” because its deterrent — Hezbollah’s arsenal — had been “a loaded gun pointed at Israel.”

The billionaire businessman argued that Israel “cannot afford now to not finish the job and completely dismantle the arsenal that has been aimed at them,” and praised Trump’s strategy of strength over negotiation.

The message underscored Kushner’s hawkish outlook on Iran and belief that its armed allies in the region must be dismantled before any lasting peace can emerge.

The Kushner Factor

Eric Mandel, director of the Middle East Political Information Network (MEPIN), told Iran International that Trump’s reliance on loyal envoys like Kushner reflects his governing style — but that Iran is a different arena entirely.

“He uses people who are loyal to him to do things way beyond what normal portfolios are,” Mandel said. “But you’re not going to change the spots of the Islamic Republic.”

Mandel warned that Kushner’s pragmatic, business-minded approach could misread Tehran’s ideological rigidity.

While Mandel sees value in verifiable understandings — such as access for inspectors, curbs on ballistic missile and limits on activity by armed allies — he doubts Tehran would treat such talks as anything more than a tactical pause.

Iran has expressly rejected curbs to its military activities as a non-starter for talks.

“If you can kick the can down the road five years, maybe ten, and get something binding, fine,” he said. “But don’t expect human-rights progress or regime transformation. They’ll stall until Trump is gone," said Mandel.

Trump’s renewed focus on Iran comes amid a regional recalibration. Following Israel’s 12-day war with Iran in June and a fragile Gaza truce, he may be testing whether Tehran’s leadership will engage diplomatically or double down on defiance.

‘The Carrot and the Stick’

Kushner’s re-emergence makes practical sense, as he retains credibility with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha, and may offer Tehran a face-saving interlocutor outside official channels, Middle East analyst, former Israeli intelligence official and author Avi Melamed told Iran International.

“It makes sense that he could be someone the Iranians would be willing to look at as a go-between,” Melamed said. “He’s a familiar figure in Gulf capitals, and his track record with the Abraham Accords gives him legitimacy others don’t have.”

Kushner has multi-billion dollar business ties with state-linked businesses in the region.

His Affinity Partners investment group partnered with Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund to help buy US videogame developer Electronic Arts last month for $55 billion, which if completed would be the largest leveraged buyout in history.

Carrot, stick

Trump’s mention of Kushner also signaled a dual strategy — diplomacy backed by implicit threat, Israeli-Iranian researcher Beni Sabti, who served as former spokesperson to Prime Minister Netanyahu, told Iran International.

“Jared is the carrot, and Israel is the stick,” he said. “Trump shows Iran that there’s a softer route if they behave, but the alternative is pressure and potential strikes.”

Yet others see opportunity rather than confrontation. With Iran under economic strain and its regional proxies weakened, some analysts believe Trump’s overture — and Kushner’s possible return — could open a narrow diplomatic window.

Melamed argued Tehran has reasons to listen. The June 12-day war severely weakened the so-called axis of resistance and exposed Iran’s regional vulnerabilities.

Coupled with new US sanctions and pressure on Iran-backed militias, “the toolkit Washington holds today is far stronger than before October 7,” he said. Melamed expects the clerical establishment to seek talks to ease economic strain while preserving its core power structure.

Sabti said Tehran’s refusal to attend last month’s Sharm el-Sheikh peace summit underscores both its isolation and its pride — a system that, he said, “would rather stay out and look strong than appear subordinate.”

Whether Kushner formally re-enters diplomacy on Iran remains unclear. But Trump’s words revived speculation first reported by Iran International podcast Eye for Iran in 2024, when Yale’s Jeffrey Sonnenfeld — who worked with Kushner on the Abraham Accords — predicted that “the only way there will be peace in the Middle East is through someone like Kushner.”

For now, Iran’s answer is silence.

The Islamic Republic declined an invitation to the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, calling recognition accords with Israel a “treacherous normalization project.”

Still, with sanctions tightening and proxies under strain, analysts agree Tehran may be preparing to reopen diplomatic channels — even if only to buy time.

The comments may signal stepped-up security cooperation between the two heavily-sanctioned powers deeply at odds with Washington and the West.

A troika of European powers triggered the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran last month, accusing Tehran of spurning diplomacy and nuclear inspections.

Russia and China sought to block the move at the UN Security Council on September 26 not enough member states supported their bid and the sanctions were reimposed the following day.

Asked in Moscow whether Russia would continue cooperating with Tehran on advanced military systems including the S-400 air defense system, Lavrov confirmed the relationship would advance.

“We will develop military-technical cooperation with Iran. After you noted the UN Security Council sanctions, we have no restrictions," RIA Novosti quoted Lavrov as saying.

"In full compliance with international law, we are engaged in supplying the equipment that the Islamic Republic of Iran needs.”

Iranian-designed drones have been key to Russia's war effort against Ukraine

While Iranian-designed drones have been key to Russia's war effort against Ukraine, Moscow provided little support during the brief summer war.

The two countries have signed a long-term security framework, but Russia’s restraint underscores the limits of its backing.

Earlier this month, leaked Russian defense documents indicated Iran had signed a €6 billion deal to buy 48 Su-35 fighter jets from Moscow, with deliveries expected between 2026 and 2028.

Last month, an Iranian lawmaker said Russian MiG-29 fighter jets had arrived in Iran as part of a short-term plan to bolster its air force, with more advanced Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft to follow gradually.

Iran has long sought to modernize its aging air force, which relies heavily on US-made jets purchased before the 1979 revolution and a small number of Russian and locally upgraded aircraft.

Western analysts say Iran’s request for 50 aircraft remains only partly fulfilled, with deliveries slowed by Russia’s own needs in Ukraine.

Tehran also faces vulnerability in air defenses after Israeli strikes earlier this year destroyed its last Russian-provided S-300 systems. Iran had acquired the four S-300 battalions from Russia in 2016.

The Islamic Republic has announced that it was invited by Egypt to participate in the summit, but the more important point is that Cairo does not act on such sensitive matters without coordination and a green light from Washington.

Therefore, this invitation should be analyzed within the broader framework of the US policy of “managing and consolidating the Middle East” — a policy that has entered a new phase following the de-escalation in Gaza and the Arab states’ move toward normalization with Israel.

On the surface, Washington suggests that Tehran, too, could be part of the peace process and even a potential signatory to the Abraham Accord. In reality, however, this message is not driven by a genuine desire to integrate the Islamic Republic into a new regional order, but rather to exert soft pressure on Tehran to move toward implicit recognition of Israel.

In other words, the invitation to Sharm el-Sheikh is a strategic test for the Islamic Republic: is Iran prepared, in exchange for an end to pressure and sanctions, to take a step — even indirectly — toward “recognizing Israel”?

Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic faces a situation where rejecting the invitation could also prove costly. Cornered and weakened, it finds its options reduced to a single question: to go or not to go to Sharm el-Sheikh.

Iran’s nuclear program has been indefinitely stalled — or, as Donald Trump put it, obliterated. Its missile program has also suffered heavy losses, with Israeli strikes inflicting serious damage on Iran’s arsenal and defense infrastructure.

In this context, the United States seeks to use Iran’s relative military weakness, mounting economic strain, the decline of its regional proxies, and Hamas’s defeat to make Tehran understand the kind of peace and stability Washington envisions for the region — a peace built on accepting the new Middle East security order, where Israel is no longer the enemy but a recognized, established power.

From Tehran’s perspective, however, attending such a summit would amount to implicitly accepting a fundamental shift in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.

Recognizing Israel — even indirectly, through participation in a joint conference — could create a deep rupture in the Islamic Republic’s ideological legitimacy. Yet refusing to attend would perpetuate the same policy of isolation and stagnation that has left the country politically and diplomatically paralyzed.

Since October 7, 2023, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly found itself in unviable positions.

Had Iran attended the Sharm el-Sheikh summit at the presidential level, it could have marked the beginning of a new chapter in its regional and even global relations.

A Pezeshkian flight to Cairo would have symbolized the collapse of the Islamic Republic’s ideological core and suggested a historic turn toward negotiation and compromise. But repeating the old pattern — avoiding such openings — once again leaves Tehran isolated, or perhaps worse, on the verge of collapse.

Thus, the real meaning of the invitation lies not in goodwill or mutual respect, but in the pressure and testing designed by the United States and its allies to define the Islamic Republic’s future course.

Today, the Islamic Republic faces a historic choice: to adapt its regional policy and join the emerging order, or to persist in its old path and bear the growing costs of isolation, economic decline, and security erosion. So far, its choice — and the fate it leads to — has become increasingly clear.