Conflicting reports persist on cause of Raisi’s fatal chopper crash

Vahid Majid said that lifting restrictions on foreign platforms will only happen if they fully comply with the Islamic Republic's laws.

Pezeshkian had earlier boldly declared, "I will stand against filtering," pledging to "free the internet" for the Iranian people.

In an interview with the official IRNA news agency, Majid criticized foreign platforms as "irresponsible" for not complying with Iran's demands, misleadingly asserting that adherence to local laws is standard practice in developed nations. However, Iran has blocked thousands of websites for political content and issues like images of women without hijab—actions that are uncommon in most developed countries.

He further insisted that lifting the restrictions and bans on popular social media platforms like Instagram, Facebook, X, Telegram, and WhatsApp would require these companies to establish official representation in Iran—essentially demanding they submit to the very censorship Pezeshkian had promised to oppose.

For many voters, Pezeshkian's promises offered a glimmer of hope in a country where the internet has been systematically strangled by the government. Over the past two decades, Iran has enacted widespread censorship, not only blocking thousands of websites but also imposing strict restrictions on global social media platforms. Even traditional media, literature, and films are heavily censored, with content scrutinized for adherence to Islamic principles.

Despite such measures, Iranians have fought back, often resorting to using VPNs to bypass the restrictions and access the global internet. But this workaround is not without its costs. The crackdown on internet freedom has decimated small businesses, particularly those run by families and women in rural areas, who rely on social media to reach customers. The Islamic Republic's iron grip on the internet has crippled thousands of small businesses, further entrenching social and economic disparities.

The ongoing censorship is part of a broader strategy by the Islamic Republic to maintain control over information and suppress dissent. In 2022, during the Women, Life, Freedom protest movement, the government escalated its efforts by filtering Instagram and WhatsApp. It went so far as to demand that Meta, the parent company of these platforms, appoint a "responsible official representative" in Iran—a demand that Meta wisely ignored.

This hardline stance was reinforced by the National Security Council and backed by Iran’s security apparatus, including the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization. They accused Instagram of manipulating artificial intelligence algorithms to spread "fake news" and incite violence, echoing the system's long-standing narrative of blaming foreign influence for domestic unrest.

As Pezeshkian’s administration takes shape, the appointment of Sattar Hashemi as the new Information and Communications Technology Minister offers little hope for change. Hashemi, who previously served as Deputy for Technology and Innovation, has not made any promises to lift internet restrictions. Instead, his action plan merely suggests "reforming" the current implementation, which in the context of the Islamic Republic, likely means maintaining the status quo.

Iran in a broader effort is to advance the "national internet" project. This initiative, inspired by China's model of digital authoritarianism, seeks to limit VPN use and enhance government surveillance capabilities.

Despite grand promises and lavish investments, this initiative has brought little benefit to ordinary Iranians. Instead, it has drained the national budget, enriching crony companies and affiliates of the clerical rulers, while citizens grapple with the daily costs of accessing an increasingly restricted internet.

Most of the cabinet ministers are not officially affiliated with any political party or group but, nevertheless, have close ties to political figures such as the "Principlist" Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, moderate conservative former President Hassan Rouhani, and hardliner factions.

Despite promises of fresh, younger faces, President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet has sparked a strong backlash among many Iranians on social media and among pundits in Tehran. The lineup is viewed as a disappointing assembly of bureaucrats and conservative figures who are unlikely to bring anything new to the table.

The following is an alphabetical list of the ministers with their brief profiles:

Aliabadi, Abbas

Ministry of Energy

The 62-year-old mechanical engineer was appointed as minister of Industry, Mines and Trade by President Ebrahim Raisi in June 2023 and one of the three ministers in his cabinet that Pezeshkian has retained among his nominees.

The former deputy minister of energy hails from the Revolutionary Guards and between 2009 and 2023 served as CEO of MAPNA Group, a formerly government-owned company responsible for power plants management.

He is not an official member of any political group or party but is believed to be close to the hardliner Paydari Party. He might also have good ties with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Araghchi, Abbas

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Araghchi, 61, who served as the political deputy of the ministry between 2017 and 2021 has underscored his adherence to the same values and beliefs as when he served as a Revolutionary Guard during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.

The former ambassador to Finland and Japan and deputy foreign minister was a member of the nuclear negotiation team led by the hardliner Saeed Jalili during President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He was retained by Mohammad-Javad Zarif until mid-2021, but was pushed aside by the hardline-dominated administration of President Ebrahim Raisi.

Araghchi is among the ministers whose appointment required the express approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who has always had the final say in the nomination of foreign ministers. Pezeshkian says he has got approval for all his ministers.

Araghchi has close ties to the administration of the former President Hassan Rouhani and Pezeshkian’s adviser Mohammad-Javad Zarif.

Araghchi, who before his appointment served as the secretary of the Strategic Foreign Relations Council, a think-tank formed by Khamenei’s order, has no official political affiliations. He can be described as a pragmatist ‘Principlist’ (conservative).

Atabak, Mohammad

Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade

Atabak, 66, is a US-educated civil engineer and former vice-president of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, the so-called ‘parliament of the private sector.’

He served as the economic deputy of the state-controlled Mostazafan Foundation between 2021 and 2023.

Attabak was sanctioned by the US government in 2020 along with Kaveh Pars Holding where he served as CEO between 2011 and 2019.

He is not known to be affiliated to any political parties or groups.

Donyamali, Ahmad

Ministry of Sports and Youth

The 64-year-old lawmaker, former Tehran City Council member, and chairman of Iran's Canoeing Federation Ahmad Donyamali was the CEO of Malavan FC of Anzali before he was appointed minister of sports.

Donyamali has a PhD in urban planning. He has held various government positions in the past two decades including deputy minister of roads and transportation and head of the Ports and Shipping Organization.

He served as Ghalibaf’s deputy in Tehran Municipality. Donyamaliand was believed to be one of the people Pezeshkian nominated as a concession to the Parliament Speaker when there were at least two other candidates with closer ties to the President.

Hashemi, Sattar

Ministry of Communications and Information Technology

The little-known technocrat nominated by the Zarif-led steering committee served as technology and innovations deputy to Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi, the former Minister of Communications under Hassan Rouhani between 2019 and 2021.

Hashemi, born in 1976, has no known affiliation to reformist or Principlist political parties or groups.

He holds a PhD in artificial intelligence from Monash University of Australia and is currently a professor of artificial intelligence and machine learning at Shiraz University. He has been an advocate of controversial plans to produce homegrown mobile phones.

He will face the daunting task of addressing internet censorship, a key issue Pezeshkian pledged to resolve during his campaign.

Some believe that he is all for restricting internet access and his advocacy of homegrown mobile phones is another prescription to establish ways of monitoring the populace.

Hemmati, Abdolnaser

Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance

The former governor of Iran's Central Bank and a presidential candidate in 2021, Hemmati is a member of the reformist Servants of Construction (Kargozaran-e Sazandegi) Party. He was backed by only some reformists in the 2021 elections, including his own party, and came fourth with just 3% of the vote.

Hemmati has criticized the government’s economic performance over the past three years, yet critics say the Central Bank implemented inflationary policies that severely devalued the national currency during his tenure.

Kazemi, Alireza

Ministry of Education

Kazemi, 59, has a PhD in philosophy of science and a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering. He served as a deputy minister of education in the Rouhani and Raisi administrations and was the deputy of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters before his appointment to the cabinet.

Kazemi’s brother, Mohammad Kazemi, is a deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards and head of its intelligence organization (SAS).

He has advocated the enforcement of compulsory hijab and is among the nominees most opposed by Pezeshkian’s supporters.

Khatib, Esmail

Ministry of Intelligence

Esmail Khatib, 63, served in Ebrahim Raisi’s administration as intelligence minister, whom Pezeshkian has retained.

The US-designated minister of intelligence has strong connections with the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence organization, having held various high-ranking positions there early in his career.

Khatib has been criticized for failing to prevent several terrorist operations in the past few years as well the recent killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh while he was a government guest in Tehran.

He is believed to be an ally of Ghalibaf.

Meydari, Ahmad

Ministry of Cooperatives, Labour, and Social Welfare

Meydari, 61, is a veteran institutionalist (socialist) economist and former reformist lawmaker.

Midari who appeared as Pezeshkian’s economic adviser during the election debates, faced substantial opposition from the hardliner-dominated parliament due to his record of opposing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s policies when he was a lawmaker and his refusal to condemn the leaders of the Green Movement. He received the lowest number of votes from lawmakers among all cabinet members.

Meydari supports Pezeshkian's advocacy of free universal education and healthcare.

Momeni, Eskandar

Ministry of Interior

Brigadier General Eskandar Momeni, 62, is a former deputy chief of the Law Enforcement Forces who hails from the Revolutionary Guards. He has served as the Secretary of the Drug Control Taskforce since 2018.

Momeni was the most controversial among the cabinet nominees. Most reformists who are wary of appointing a military figure to head the interior ministry opposed his nomination.

Many hold Momeni responsible for crackdowns on anti-government protests in the past few years. He has repeatedly referred to protesters as “rioters”.

President Pezeshkian has criticized and opposed the enforcement of hijab by the police morality patrols, but Momeni is known for his defense of such measures.

Momeni is believed to be one of at least three that Pezeshkian nominated as a concession to Ghalibaf.

Nasirzadeh, Aziz

Ministry of Defence

Brigadier General Nasirzadeh, 59, is currently the deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. He hails from Iran's regular Army where he served as deputy air force commander between 2018 and 2021.

He is believed to be close to Ghalibaf. He received the highest votes of confidence from lawmakers.

Nouri-Ghezeljeh, Gholamreza

Ministry of Agriculture

Nouri-Ghezeljeh, 54, a lawmaker, is a member of the reformist Servants of Construction (Kargozaran) Party. Along with Pezeshkian he co-founded the Independents' Faction of Parliament.

He has a PhD in agricultural economy and has a record of serving as deputy agriculture minister.

Paknejad, Mohsen

Ministry of Oil

Paknejad, 57, has a master’s degree in industrial engineering. He joined the oil ministry in 1991 and served in various positions including deputy minister between 2018 and 2021 in the administration of President Hassan Rouhani.

Paknejad must address challenges including an inevitable reduction in government fuel subsidies and the politically volatile issue of increasing prices. He also faces huge problems Iran's oil industry is grappling with due to sanctions.

He is believed to be close to Rouhani’s political circle.

Rahimi, Amin-Hossein

Ministry of Justice

Rahimi, 56, is one of the three ministers in Ebrahim Raisi’s government that Pezeshkian has retained.

He has also served as deputy for human resources and cultural affairs, prosecutor general of the Court of Audit, and advisor to the head of the Judiciary.

Rahimi does not belong to any political party or group but hails from the circle of Principlist (right-winger) Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei. He also has close ties to hardliner Paydari group.

Sadegh-Mavaljerd, Farzaneh

Ministry of Roads and Urban Development

Sadegh-Mavaljerd, 48, was the only female nominee in Pezeshkian’s proposed cabinet and is now the second female minister in the Islamic Republic.

She has served nearly thirty years at the ministry and is currently its deputy for architecture and urban planning.

She does not have known political affiliations.

Salehi, Abbas

Culture and Islamic Guidance

Salehi, 61, is a former minister of culture and Islamic guidance in Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet between 2013 and 2017 and currently heads the Ettelaat Newspaper Institute and the International University of Islamic Denominations.

He has a seminary education and close ties to Shia seminaries and Islamic Propaganda Organization but does not wear clerical robes.

He is believed to be close to Hassan Rouhani’s political circle, although he is criticized for his weak record in the Rouhani administration.

When defending his proposed cabinet, Pezeshkian said Salehi had refused his invitation but Khamenei insisted that he accepted the offer.

Salehi-Amiri, Reza

Ministry of Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts

Salehi-Amiri, 63, served as minister of culture and Islamic guidance from 2016 to 2017 and as acting minister of sports from 2013 to 2014 in Hassan Rouhani’s administration.

He hails from the intelligence ministry and has held various other positions including as adviser to the president and head of the National Library under Rouhani as well as social and cultural deputy of the reformist mayor of Tehran, Mohammad-Ali Najafi, for a few months in 2017.

He is known as a moderate conservative and a close ally of Rouhani.

Simaei-Sarraf, Hossein

Ministry of Science, Research and Technology

Simaei-Sarraf, 56, is a lawyer, politician, and university professor who served as the Cabinet Secretary in Hassan Rouhani’s administration between 2019 and 2021.

He is not an official member of any political party or group.

Zafarghandi, Mohammad-Reza

Ministry of Health

Zafarghandi, 66, is a former Chairman of Iran's non-governmental Medical Council.

He was among the outspoken critics of the government’s vaccination policies during the pandemic. He opposed giving an official status to ‘Islamic Medicine’ strongly promoted by some clerics and called it meddling in science.

He has also repeatedly warned about circumstances leading to widespread medical staff emigration.

Zafarghandi who heads the Islamic Association of Iranian Medical Community is the only “progressive reformist” in Pezeshkian’s proposed cabinet.

“The timing, conditions, and manner of Iran’s response will be meticulously orchestrated to ensure that it occurs at a moment of maximum surprise; perhaps when their eyes are fixed on the skies and their radar screens, they will be taken by surprise from the ground—or perhaps even by a combination of both,” the mission said in a statement to Wall Street Journal.

The message, which was widely covered by Iranian domestic media, underscored that Tehran’s response must achieve two primary objectives: to both punish Israel and deter future attacks. However, it also stressed that this response "must be carefully calibrated to avoid any possible adverse impact that could potentially influence a prospective ceasefire."

While US officials have suggested that a Gaza ceasefire might avert Iranian retaliation for the July assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iranian authorities have dismissed this but reiterated that they would not jeopardize the ceasefire. This is while, despite US efforts, a resolution between Israel and Hamas remains uncertain, with the latest ceasefire talks expected to persist this week.

"We are not looking to intensify insecurity in the region. We support efforts with good intentions regarding the ceasefire. Meanwhile, we insist on Iran's legal right to realize its rights, punish the aggressor, and create deterrence against a terrorist regime. We will use it at the appropriate time," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Nasser Kanaani on Monday.

The Islamic Republic signals a commitment to its threats of retaliation while simultaneously expressing a cautious intent to avoid exacerbating the regional crisis. This posture suggests an effort to navigate the delicate balance of maintaining influence, particularly among regional proxies, without fully committing to direct conflict with Israel and the US, given the underlying economic pressures.

Echoing this cautious tone, Mohsen Rezaee, former IRGC commander-in-chief, told CNN on Tuesday, "We have investigated the possible repercussions. And we will not let Netanyahu, sinking in a swamp, save himself. The Iranian actions will be very calculated."

Similarly, Ali-Mohammad Naini, the IRGC spokesperson, noted, "Time is on our side, and the waiting period for this response may be prolonged," indicating a strategic shift from Tehran’s earlier threats of immediate and severe retaliation.

"I invited [Abbas] Salehi (the proposed minister for culture), but he kept refusing. When I told Khamenei that Salehi wouldn’t come, he picked up the phone and told me to tell him to accept,” Pezeshkian confessed. The admission revealed the control the Supreme Leader exercises over the supposedly independent branches of government in Iran, where loyalty to Khamenei trumps any other metric for government selection process, eclipsing merit-based selection.

The parliament, which many view as a mere formality, voted to confirm all 19 of Pezeshkian’s proposed ministers on Wednesday. The votes were overwhelmingly in favor, with figures like Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh winning 281 and Education Minister Alireza Kazemi and Communications Minister Sattar Hashemi receiving as many as 268 and 264 votes out of a total of 290, respectively. Even the least supported nominee, Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi for Health Minister, still secured 163 votes.

Pezeshkian also revealed that ministers like Abbas Araghchi (Foreign Affairs) and Farzaneh Sadegh (Roads and Urban Development) were personally vetted and endorsed by Khamenei.

“I gave the entire list to Khamenei. Everyone came with coordination and consensus,” Pezeshkian admitted.

He urged the MPs "not to disrupt the harmony and unity within his team" and said, "I'm not saying these people are without flaws or that we are ideal, but we have reached an agreement on them."

The president further emphasized, "I had ideals in mind, but when I saw there was no agreement or consensus, I stepped back from them because consensus is more important to me. I compromised, and I will continue to compromise for the sake of unity."

Pezeshkian added, "We reached an agreement with the security organizations, the IRGC, and the intelligence agencies, and together we presented this cabinet list."

The disparity between the system's frequent boasts of democratic principles and its observed practices has led observers to question the authenticity of the system's institutions.

Many believe that the Wednesday parliamentary session was less about debate and decision-making, and more about rubber-stamping the will of Iran’s ultimate authority. The overwhelming vote counts—such as 272 votes for Abbas Salehi—highlight the absence of genuine opposition within the parliament, where Khamenei’s word is law.

Nurses in 50 hospitals are leading the charge in terms of the number of strikes, followed by telecom retirees in five provinces, retirees from the banking and social security sectors, and workers from the oil and gas industries. Additionally, farmers in Isfahan have staged a sit-in. The nurses have garnered support from retirees, teachers, and the truckers' union, further amplifying their cause.

When examining the recent history of trade union and non-union protests, a stark contrast emerges between the periods before and after 2017. Since December 2017, labor protests in Iran have evolved from spontaneous, uncoordinated street demonstrations into continuous, well-organized movements characterized by networked communication among similar professions. While various factors—economic, political, social, environmental, and legal—have influenced these protests, economic hardship has played the most significant role.

Amid these street protests, certain recurring slogans resonate: "Our problem is here, yet they blame America," "Retirees, shout for your rights!" "Only in the streets can we claim our rights," "We’ve seen no justice, only lies," and "When it’s our turn, the treasury runs dry."

This piece zeroes in on a single aspect of Iran's socio-economic landscape: why don’t these expressions of discontent coalesce into larger waves of protest against the government, thereby lowering the cost of dissent? The backdrop to this question is the harsh living conditions in Iran, particularly for those dependent on monthly salaries. While annual salary increases hover around 10-20%, inflation rates soar above 40 percent.

Three key factors contribute to this situation: 1) the ongoing cat-and-mouse game between the government and protesters, 2) the lack of strong, comprehensive trade unions and the severe political repercussions for activism—including the threat of imprisonment and even execution—faced by union and labor leaders, and 3) the government’s monopoly over the labor market, which drastically limits opportunities for re-employment.

Unions long disbanded

After shutting down all labor unions in the 1980s, the Islamic government introduced state-funded Islamic labor councils. However, these councils did little for workers, given their reliance on the state. As a result, in the 1990s, some workers and employees began establishing their own unofficial unions. During the last three decades, the government has arrested and imprisoned thousands of union activists for their participation in the establishment of trade unions and even issued a death sentence for some of them, such as the recent death sentence for Sharifeh Mohammadi. The most famous and powerful of these unions are the Drivers' Union of the Tehran Public Transportation, Haft Tappeh Sugar Cane Mill Labor Syndicate, and the Teachers' Union Council.

For this reason, organizing a strike and holding a protest rally in Iran is very difficult and risky. However, between 2020 and 2021, more than 2,500 gatherings (mostly held without permit) were held throughout the country. According to a former Ministry of Interior's spokesperson, during the first term of the Rouhani administration (2013-2017), people in different cities of Iran held about 43 thousand gatherings "with or without permission" to pursue their demands in various fields. Even if this number seems unreal, Iranians’ grievances are limitless.

Livelihood issues are deteriorating the quality of life and placing such unbearable pressure on wage earners that workers and employees are willing to endure the risks of repression to take to the streets in protest.

Carrot and stick

One of the Islamic Republic's common tactics for dealing with union and profession-based protests when they spill into the streets involves a combination of harsh threats, such as dismissal and imprisonment, alongside small concessions to placate some protesters. For instance, during the pensioners' protests coinciding with the presidential election, the government paid 3 million tomans ($50) into their accounts—far short of the additional salary they legally demanded. This tactic appeased a portion of the protesters, causing the movement to lose momentum. The widespread teachers' protests in recent months were handled similarly, with mass arrests and the payment of one month’s extra salary to retiring teachers and assistant teachers, which helped to quell the unrest.

Risk of permanent unemployment

The government in Iran is the largest employer, with about eighty percent of the economy controlled by three powerful economic entities under the supervision of the Leader’s office, the IRGC, and state-owned companies. Beyond these, public resources are managed by the government, and most public services are state-owned. In this environment, anyone dismissed for organizing or participating in a trade union must effectively say goodbye to the public sector—and likely to stable employment as well. The government and these economic empires act like a giant gatekeeper, monopolizing the job market, enforcing ideological hiring practices, and making intimidation easy.