Iranians discuss Trump envoy’s interest in visiting Tehran

“It is time for Iran to walk away completely from its desire to have a nuclear weapon. And they will not, and cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapons program, that’s enrichment, weaponization, and its strategic missile program,” Waltz said.

“The President has all options on the table. But we want to be clear, this isn't some kind of, you know, kind of tit for tat that we had under the Obama administration, or Biden. This is the full program. Give it up, or there will be consequences,” he added.

His comments came in contrast to the much more conciliatory tone of Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, who spoke of the US president's intention to resolve Iran's nuclear dispute diplomatically.

Earlier this month, Trump wrote a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in an attempt to explore a new nuclear agreement and prevent military escalation, Witkoff told Fox News on Sunday.

"We don't need to solve everything militarily," Witkoff said.

He emphasized that Iran cannot have a nuclear bomb, saying, “It cannot happen and it will not happen.”

"Our signal to Iran is let's sit down and see if we can, through dialogue, through diplomacy, get to the right place. If we can, we are prepared to do that. And if we can't, the alternative is not a great alternative."

On Friday, Witkoff told the Tucker Carlson show, “We should talk. We should clear up the misconceptions. We should create a verification program so that nobody worries about weaponization of your nuclear material."

He also said Trump believes the issue “has a real possibility of being solved diplomatically” and “acknowledged that he's open to an opportunity to clean it all up with Iran.”

His remarks raised questions about the Trump's administration's approach toward Iran, as Trump's Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and National Security Advisor, Michael Waltz, have taken a much tougher stance, insisting over the past few weeks that Iran's nuclear program must be dismantled and that Iran will face military action unless it complies with US demands.

"We don't need to solve everything militarily," Steve Witkoff told Fox News.

"Our signal to Iran is let's sit down and see if we can, through dialogue, through diplomacy, get to the right place. If we can, we are prepared to do that. And if we can't, the alternative is not a great alternative."

Witkoff emphasized that Iran cannot have a nuclear bomb, saying, “It cannot happen and it will not happen.”

On Friday, Witkoff said Iran used indirect channels to respond after the US president sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei earlier this month.

“I’m not at liberty to talk about the specifics,” Witkoff said in an interview released Friday on The Tucker Carlson Show, saying only it was through "back channels through multiple countries".

Last week, an Emirati official brought a letter from Trump proposing nuclear talks with Tehran, which Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected, saying such a proposal was deception from Washington amid crippling sanctions on Iran.

Iran's foreign ministry said Tehran will respond privately to Trump's letter and will not make public its contents.

Witkoff's remarks come as a senior Iranian nuclear official on Sunday said that Iran will not yield to Western pressure regarding its nuclear program, warning that such pressure could have adverse effects on cooperation.

Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), emphasized Iran's determination to advance its nuclear industry and counter what he described as unjust accusations from Western powers.

In an interview on Sunday, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said talks with the US are currently impossible unless significant changes occur as Washington awaits Tehran's response to its invitation for talks on a new nuclear deal.

Will he demand a complete halt to uranium enrichment, or permit Iran to purify uranium to a low level, such as 3.65%? The JCPOA, signed during the Obama administration, set that exact limit.

Enrichment and centrifuges

Tehran is now rapidly enriching uranium to 60%, having accumulated 274.8 kilograms (605.8 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60% as of February 26. That’s an increase of 92.5 kilograms (203.9 pounds) since the IAEA’s last report in November. The current stockpile can easily be sufficient for further enrichment to produce six nuclear bombs.

Iran maintains that it has the right to enrich uranium as part of its civilian nuclear ambitions. While 3.65% enrichment is used for peaceful energy purposes, 60% has no credible civilian application and is just one step short of weapons-grade enrichment at 90%.

A closely related issue is the number and type of enrichment machines—Iran’s centrifuges. Under the JCPOA, Iran was limited to 6,104 first-generation centrifuges, with no use of advanced models. Today, it operates more than 8,000 centrifuges, including more advanced IR-6 machines, which were explicitly banned under the deal.

Key questions remain unanswered: How many centrifuges, if any, would the US allow Iran to keep? Would decommissioned machines be permitted to stay in the country under international monitoring? Would Washington demand that most, if not all, be dismantled? Could it ask Iran to transfer them to a third country, such as Russia?

These questions are central to understanding what Trump’s plan might be for denying Iran a path to nuclear weapons. So far, no clear answers have emerged.

Is Trump’s plan a total nuclear ban or verification?

If talks resume and the US agrees to let Iran retain some enrichment capacity, a new agreement may not look so different from the JCPOA that Trump abandoned in 2018, calling it a “bad deal.” The key distinction, however, could lie in permanence: a new deal might cap Iran’s enrichment capabilities indefinitely, unlike the JCPOA’s temporary restrictions under sunset clauses.

Still, there is at least a political difference between a permanent ban on all enrichment and formally recognizing Iran’s right to enrich—however limited that right may be.

There is also the issue of somewhat differing statements coming from the President and some of his top officials. According to Axios, Trump’s letter to Ali Khamenei included a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear agreement and warned of consequences if Iran expanded its nuclear program. The letter was described by sources as “tough” in tone.

However, Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, framed the message differently in an interview released Friday on The Tucker Carlson Show. Referring to the letter, he said: “It roughly said, I'm a president of peace. That's what I want. There's no reason for us to do this militarily. We should talk. We should clear up the misconceptions. We should create a verification program so that nobody worries about weaponization of your nuclear material.”

This tone stands in stark contrast to statements by the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, who have called for the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program—not just verification.

Multilateral or bilateral talks?

The Obama administration, building on the approach of the Bush era, dealt with Iran in coordination with European allies while also involving Russia and China in the JCPOA negotiations. This multilateral strategy gave international legitimacy to the pressure on Tehran and, for a time, resulted in UN-imposed economic sanctions—until the 2015 agreement was signed and sanctions were subsequently lifted.

However, this approach also gave Iran some room to maneuver, as China and Russia provided support during the JCPOA negotiations. The temporary nature of the agreement and its allowance for Iran to retain its uranium enrichment capability may have stemmed from the fact that the US was not only negotiating with Tehran but also balancing the interests of Beijing and Moscow.

The question now is whether the Trump administration will face pressure to once again include Russia and China in any future talks—or whether it will insist on negotiating directly with Tehran, without outside involvement.

Iran held consultations with Russia and China earlier this month and would certainly prefer to have diplomatic backing in a multilateral setting.

Both Russia and China have signaled that any negotiations should focus solely on Iran’s nuclear program, excluding other US demands such as restrictions on ballistic missiles or curbing regional influence. Iran will almost certainly seek to involve both powers—especially Russia—believing that President Vladimir Putin may hold some sway with Trump.

Although bilateral talks may be preferable from the US perspective, the reality remains that if Washington seeks UN endorsement for any future agreement, it will need the backing of both Russia and China.

Another JCPOA?

Although the Trump administration has issued an ultimatum of “negotiations or else” to Tehran, it remains unclear whether it intends to impose strict demands for dismantling key elements of Iran’s nuclear program or enter into bargaining over critical issues such as the right to uranium enrichment, the level of enrichment, and the number and type of centrifuges.

In the latter case, and if Iran is able to salvage its right to enrichment, the resulting agreement will be somewhat similar to the 2015 JCPOA.

Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), emphasized Iran's determination to advance its nuclear industry and counter what he described as unjust accusations from Western powers.

"The Islamic Republic of Iran is firm and resolute in asserting its rights," Kamalvandi said in an interview with the AEOI's public diplomacy and information center on Sunday.

He criticized what he called negative propaganda against Iran's nuclear activities, asserting that Iran is subject to the most extensive inspections globally and maintains a transparent program.

He defended Iran's decision to suspend some JCPOA commitments, citing the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018 and the failure of other parties to uphold their obligations.

"Fifteen consecutive IAEA reports confirmed Iran's compliance with its commitments," Kamalvandi said. "We waited a year after the US withdrawal, but ultimately, we exercised our rights."

While Tehran has reduced IAEA inspections since 2021 and in 2023 barred a third of the inspectors, it continues to argue that its nuclear activities are peaceful.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi recently said the UN body was willing to assist Iran in proving it was not seeking nuclear weapons.

Kamalvandi warned Western nations that pressuring Iran would be counterproductive. "We hope that Western countries, who have tested Iran many times, have now realized that pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran is ineffective and may even have the opposite effect," Kamalvandi noted.

"A nation with a history of thousands of years cannot be addressed with force," he added. "We have endured and overcome numerous pressures throughout history, and we will emerge victorious from the current ones."

Kamalvandi highlighted Iran's achievements in nuclear technology, including advancements in reactor and power plant construction, and strengthened relations with countries like China and Russia.

He also pointed to the successful hosting of an international nuclear science and technology conference in Isfahan, attended by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials.

Iran has enriched uranium to up to 60% fissile purity, closer to the 90% needed for a bomb.

Iran's uranium stock refined to up to 60% grew by 92.5 kilograms (kg) in the past quarter to 274.8 kg, one of the IAEA reports said. According to an IAEA yardstick, the amount is enough in principle for six nuclear bombs if enriched further.

Khamenei’s formal role in economic planning

While Khamenei does not directly manage economic ministries or oversee the national budget—duties formally assigned to the presidential administration and parliament—he exerts control through other channels. This influence, rooted in both constitutional authority and informal networks, is complex and multifaceted.

According to Article 110 of Iran’s Constitution, Khamenei has the authority to determine the general policies of the Islamic Republic. In collaboration with the Expediency Council, whose members he appoints, Khamenei issues "General Policies of the System," which shape the country’s economic direction.

The Planning and Budget Organization, an administrative body, must ensure that Iran’s development plans—such as macro policies in the oil sector—align with the overarching guidelines drawn in the General Policies of the System documents.

Political

He also holds sway over the expenditure of oil revenues. Any withdrawal from the National Development Fund of Iran (NDFI) requires his approval, for instance. At least 20 percent of all oil revenues are allocated to the NDFI, and successive administrations, including Masoud Pezeshkian’s, have sought his permission to borrow billions of dollars from the fund over the years to cover budget deficits.

Directing the economy through political engineering

Khamenei appoints the head of the judiciary and the members of the constitutional Guardian Council, which has the power to veto legislation, including economic policies and budget plans if they conflict with his prescribed policies. As Iran's election watchdog, the Council also engineers all elections and ensures that candidates whose platforms are not aligned with Khamenei’s political and economic vision are not elected as president or make it to the parliament.

Economic entities under Khamenei’s direct control

Khamenei wields significant economic power through a network of quasi-charitable foundations, known as bonyads, and religious endowments.

Among the largest bonyads are:

• Mostazafan Foundation
• Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order Headquarters
• Martyrs Foundation

Originally established to redistribute wealth and support social welfare following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, these institutions have evolved into major economic conglomerates operating in diverse sectors, including agriculture, construction, mining, energy, manufacturing, telecommunications, financial services, and real estate.

Their financial activities remain opaque, despite assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars.

These entities function as strategic instruments for maintaining Khamenei’s political and economic dominance. By appointing their leadership, he ensures loyalty and strengthens his control. They also help finance Iran’s regional allies and domestic political factions aligned with him through a complex system of privilege distribution—commonly referred to as rent in Iranian economic and political jargon.

The IRGC’s economic influence

The Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), which operate directly under Khamenei’s authority as commander-in-chief, also control vast segments of Iran’s economy. They are allocated a portion of the country’s oil exports, which they reportedly sell through front companies and intermediaries to evade US sanctions—generating funds for their military operations and regional activities.

The IRGC dominates industries such as construction, energy, and telecommunications. Additionally, it is granted a direct share of Iran’s oil revenues, allegedly selling oil through front companies and third-party intermediaries to bypass US sanctions and finance military and regional operations.

The extent of Khamenei’s economic control

Quantifying the economic footprint of bonyads, religious endowments, and the IRGC is difficult due to their opaque financial practices. Nonetheless, estimates suggest these entities collectively control at least half of Iran’s GDP.

Though they are technically subject to taxation and audits, they use complex methods to conceal financial data, making meaningful oversight nearly impossible.

Khamenei’s firm grip over these institutions reinforces his dominance over the Iranian economy, limiting transparency and blocking major reforms. This control expanded significantly after a 2005 privatization initiative that channeled state assets not to a genuine private sector, but to IRGC-linked entities, bonyads, and companies benefiting from monopolistic privileges.