An Iranian delegation including nuclear scientists with ties to a sanctioned military research unit travelled to Russia last year to visit institutes producing dual-use technologies, the Financial Times reported on Tuesday.
The visit, in August 2024, was led by Ali Kalvand, a 43-year-old Iranian nuclear physicist, who arrived in Moscow on a diplomatic service passport along with four others, according to the report.
While Kalvand said they represented a private consulting firm, Western officials told the newspaper the delegation included a military counter-intelligence officer and members linked to Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), described by the US as “the direct successor organization to Iran’s pre-2004 nuclear weapons program.”
Iran has long denied seeking nuclear weapons, citing a religious edict by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei banning their use, and says its nuclear activities are entirely peaceful. Khamenei said last month that the West uses Tehran’s nuclear program as an excuse for confrontation.
Iran International reported last year, citing three independent sources in Iran, that the Islamic Republic was advancing its secret nuclear weapons program by restructuring the SPND.
According to the Financial Times, the Iranian delegation met with Russian companies that manufacture dual‑use components, including electron accelerators and klystrons — equipment used in nuclear implosion simulations.
The delegation’s members also included experts in neutron generators – devices with civilian and military applications – and radiation testing, as well as a former head of a company sanctioned by Washington for acting as a procurement front for SPND.
Tritium request raises concern
The Iranian delegation also sought access to radioactive isotopes such as tritium, a substance with civilian uses but strictly controlled under global non‑proliferation rules because of its role in enhancing the yield of nuclear warheads.
The report said it reviewed a letter from Kalvand’s firm to a Russian supplier in May 2024 expressing interest in acquiring several isotopes, including tritium.
“It’s disturbing that these types of people can have this type of meeting in Russia, given the state Russia and Iran are in,” said Pranay Vaddi, a former senior director for non-proliferation at the US National Security Council.
“Regardless of whether the Russians are sharing components or technology, SPND is an organization who would be applying that specifically to nuclear weapons work.”
David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security, told the paper: “We consider that a type of nuclear weapons program — to shorten the timeline... The leadership didn’t want to make a decision to build a weapon for various reasons. This sort of research activity allowed the leadership to say there was no nuclear weapons program.”
What is SPND?
SPND was established in 2011 by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who Western intelligence agencies believed oversaw Iran’s earlier nuclear weapons program, known as the Amad Plan, before it was halted in 2003. The US and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) consider SPND its institutional successor.
The US has repeatedly sanctioned SPND and affiliated companies, citing their role in “dual-use research and development activities applicable to nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems.”
In 2024, Iran’s parliament formally recognized SPND under Iranian law, placing it under the defense ministry and exempting its budget from parliamentary oversight.
During Israeli attacks on Iran in June, Saeed Borji, a senior Iranian explosives expert and key figure in Iran’s nuclear-related defense programs, was killed. He headed the Center for Explosion and Impact Technology Research (known by its Persian acronym Metfaz), a subsidiary of the SPND.
Also among the delegates was Soroush Mohtashami, a neutron‑generator specialist trained under Fereydoon Abbasi‑Davani, who was also killed in the June attacks that, according to Israel, left at least nine scientists dead.
At the time, the military said all those killed had worked on the complex engineering mechanism that triggers the uranium core’s nuclear explosion.
Ian Stewart, head of the Washington office of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told the newspaper: “While there could be benign explanations for these visits, the totality of the information available points to a possibility that Iran’s SPND is seeking to sustain its nuclear weapons-related knowhow by tapping Russian expertise.”
Prominent foreign policy journals, think tanks and legacy media outlets have consistently portrayed the UN sanctions "snapback" mechanism under UNSCR 2231 not as a legal obligation but as a geopolitical hazard.
Reimposing sanctions, they argue, would empower Iranian hardliners, obstruct humanitarian aid and alienate allies. Though presented as cautious and pragmatic, such positions align with Tehran’s longstanding arguments.
This consensus persists despite mounting evidence of Iran’s sustained non-compliance.
In March 2025, US President Donald Trump issued a 60-day ultimatum demanding Iran reduce enrichment and allow expanded IAEA access. Tehran swiftly rejected the demand.
On the 61st day, Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites, capped off by deeper US strikes on underground enrichment facilities on June 22. A ceasefire took effect on June 24, but the crisis persisted.
Recent escalation, strategic defiance
The IAEA’s resolution of June 12, 2025, confirmed that undeclared nuclear material remained unaccounted for and that the Agency could no longer verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.
On July 4–5, 2025, Iran expelled all inspectors and terminated monitoring protocols, eliminating the last vestige of international oversight.
These actions—alongside continued enrichment to 60%—represent clear violations of Articles II and III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which bar non-nuclear-weapon states from acquiring certain nuclear technologies and mandate IAEA safeguards.
Although Article IV affirms a right to peaceful nuclear energy, that right is strictly conditional upon compliance with Articles II and III. In the words of former IAEA deputy chief Pierre Goldschmidt, "enrichment is not an unconditional entitlement."
These violations explicitly trigger the condition of "significant non-performance" under UNSCR 2231, legally mandating sanctions snapback."
Binding legal obligations
The snapback mechanism embedded in UNSCR 2231 reflects the principle that enforcement must not be held hostage to political convenience.
Iran’s material breaches—expelling inspectors, concealing enriched uranium, continuing high-level enrichment, and refusing to account for undeclared material—trigger conditions for significant non-performance.
UNSCR 2231 operates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Articles 39–42 empower the Security Council to determine threats and impose binding measures.
Article 25 obligates all Member States to “accept and carry out” such decisions, while Article 103 ensures Charter obligations supersede conflicting treaties—including the JCPOA.
No expiry date
The International Court of Justice, in its 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion, affirmed that resolutions under Chapter VII bind all Member States. Once reinstated, sanctions remain legally binding until explicitly lifted by another resolution of equal authority.
International law broadly supports this, as noted by scholars Sue Eckert and Haroun Rahimi. Sanctions do not expire through diplomacy or political shifts. They remain binding.
The Istanbul summit on July 25, 2025, convened Iran and the E3 (UK, France, Germany) amid intense diplomatic pressure but produced no breakthrough.
Iran had already expelled inspectors and resumed 60% enrichment. Uranium removed before the June strikes remains unaccounted for.
The July 22 Qaem-100 satellite launch, despite civilian framing, clearly signals ongoing dual-use missile capabilities. On July 21, Araghchi publicly asserted Iran would proceed regardless of international pressure. The pattern is unmistakable: deliberate defiance.
Abdication not caution
Upholding UNSCR 2231 through snapback is not an expedient—it is a legal obligation. When enforcement mechanisms are neglected, the architecture of deterrence collapses. Delay becomes paralysis, and paralysis risks open conflict.
As Winston Churchill warned amid interwar failures of collective security: "The malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous."
Deferring action under UNSCR 2231 amounts not to caution but to abdication.
The E3 now stands at a historical precipice. It can uphold the very enforcement mechanism it established in 2015 or to let it lapse—and with it, allow binding Security Council resolutions to fade into irrelevance.
Triggering snapback means defending the Charter and forestalling further conflict in an already volatile region.