Iran International
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stands at a critical crossroads: should he continue pushing for his political vision despite mounting opposition, or bow to pressure and step down?
In recent days, Pezeshkian has expressed growing frustration over obstacles confronting his administration.
Four issues stand out in particular: the formal adoption of the hijab law, negotiations with the United States, the impeachment of Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati, and the forced removal of Strategic Deputy Mohammad-Javad Zarif from the cabinet.
Despite emphasizing "unity," Pezeshkian seems increasingly doubtful that his so-called "unity government"—which includes only four reformist ministers, while key positions remain dominated by hardliners—can deliver on his campaign promises.
Meanwhile, his political opponents, deeply entrenched in other centers of power, continue to undermine his efforts.
Signs of defiance
On Wednesday, Pezeshkian's executive deputy, Mohammad-Jafar Ghaempanah, made a striking statement on platform X, saying that Pezeshkian would continue to refuse to enforce the hijab law, despite pressure from his hardline rivals.
The law, dormant since receiving final approval from the ultra-hardline Guardian Council in mid-September, was suspended by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) amid concerns of public backlash.
Such a decision could not have occurred without the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The President’s refusal to sign and formally announce the controversial law is therefore largely symbolic—Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf retains the power to activate it whenever Khamenei’s appointees in the SNSC and other power centers decide to shift their stance.
While Pezeshkian had previously voiced opposition to the hijab law, his recent statements have been more assertive. “I will not stand against the people,” Ghaempanah quoted him as saying.
Beyond this, Pezeshkian has increasingly distanced himself from policies dictated by higher authorities, including Khamenei.
Last week, he openly admitted that direct negotiations with the US to lift sanctions—something he supports—are not taking place because Khamenei opposes them.
This marks the first time an Iranian president, while still in office, has directly and publicly acknowledged a major policy disagreement with Khamenei on such a critical national issue.
Equally telling was Pezeshkian's reaction to the hardline-dominated Parliament’s impeachment and removal of the economy minister on March 2.
Under the law, the President has three months to propose a replacement to Parliament. However, ultra-hardline lawmaker Meysam Zohourian claims Pezeshkian stated as he left Parliament that he would not nominate a successor.
Additionally, over the past six months, Pezeshkian has resisted opponents' demands to remove his Strategic Deputy Mohammad-Javad Zarif from the cabinet, recognizing Zarif's potential significance in negotiations with the United States.
On March 2, after meeting with Chief Justice Mohseni-Ejei, Zarif posted on X that the Chief Justice advised him to return to academia to prevent further pressure on the government.
Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani later confirmed that Zarif had submitted his resignation, but President Pezeshkian has not yet approved it.
Is Pezeshkian's resignation on the table?
During his campaign, Pezeshkian stated he would step down if he found himself unable to deliver on his promises.
Some reformist politicians and activists are now calling on him to follow through, arguing that if he cannot enact meaningful reforms, he should resign.
Others believe it is too early to surrender and are urging him to continue.
Meanwhile, ultra-hardliners have intensified their calls for his resignation, citing Iran’s worsening economic crisis.
Pezeshkian has not publicly addressed the possibility of resignation.
A source close to his office told Iran International Pezeshkian is feeling shaken after losing Hemmati and Zarif from his cabinet, but also said he is not a quitter.
However, emboldened by the 200 votes of no confidence against Economy Minister Hemmati—more than two-thirds of all lawmakers—ultra-hardliners could push to impeach Pezeshkian if he grows more defiant.
Under the Islamic Republic's Constitution, the president can be impeached if one-third of lawmakers support the motion. If two-thirds vote against him, he can be removed from office.
Only once in the past 46 years has Parliament taken this route—when it ousted Abolhassan Banisadr, the Islamic Republic’s first president, in 1981.
Russia is an active geopolitical player with its own vested interests, Nematollah Izadi told ILNA News Agency on Friday.
"There is no doubt the Russians are interested in mediating between Iran and the US, but whether they can do so effectively remains in doubt," Izadi said. "They play a role in regional issues concerning Iran, the US, and Europe and have their own interests. Therefore, they cannot be impartial mediators."
He also urged Iran to adopt a balanced foreign policy, warning against over-reliance on a single ally.
"If Iran fails to do so, all of its foreign policy ‘eggs’ will end up in Russia’s basket—and most likely China’s as well," he said. "This will undoubtedly have negative consequences, as it will limit Iran’s options."
His remarks come following an alarming report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) earlier this week.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi revealed that Iran had significantly increased its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, raising further concerns over its nuclear intentions.
Grossi also acknowledged that Western sanctions have failed to curb Tehran’s nuclear expansion, with its program growing significantly in recent years.
“Sanctions aren’t working,” Grossi told Bloomberg. “Quite obviously, the country has learned to circumvent them. The program has grown enormously, especially since 2018.”
The IAEA has consistently argued that there is no credible civilian use for uranium enriched to 60%, as it is just a short technical step from weapons-grade (90%) uranium.
Russia’s expanding role in Iran talks
As Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West intensifies, Russia has positioned itself as a key diplomatic actor, proposing talks with Washington.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov met with Iranian Ambassador Kazem Jalali on Thursday to discuss international efforts to resolve issues surrounding Iran's nuclear program, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced on Friday.
Moscow has agreed to assist the US in communicating with Iran on various issues, including its nuclear program and support for regional anti-US proxies, according to a Bloomberg report on Tuesday, later confirmed by the Kremlin.
The report, later picked up by Russian state media, quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying that "Russia believes that the United States and Iran should resolve all problems through negotiations" and that Moscow "is ready to do everything in its power to achieve this."
Last month, before the Russian offer of mediation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran, where both sides "aligned their positions" on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal that unraveled following the US withdrawal in 2018.
Additionally, in an exclusive interview with BBC Persian, Russia’s IAEA envoy Mikhail Ulyanov dismissed Western concerns about Iran’s uranium enrichment, calling US and European warnings a "political pressure tactic."
"Our Western colleagues seem to think the Middle East is too calm, and they want to add fuel to the fire," Ulyanov said.
Missile program and regional influence: a key sticking point
A major sticking point in nuclear negotiations is whether talks will include Iran’s missile program and regional influence, issues that the US insists must be addressed in any new deal, but Tehran and Moscow reject.
"Negotiations should not include Iran’s missile program or its regional influence," Ulyanov said. "Adding these topics would complicate the process and make it unmanageable."
This mirrors the original 2015 JCPOA, which focused solely on Iran’s nuclear program while excluding its missile program and regional activities, a framework Iran insists must remain unchanged.
Iran's shift away from the West
Izadi’s concerns over Russia’s mediation come amid Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s ban on negotiations with the United States, issued in early February after President Donald Trump announced plans to intensify sanctions. Trump called for an agreement that would permanently prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Khamenei has long pushed for closer ties with Russia and China, rejecting reliance on the US and Europe, a stance that has hardened since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and renewed sanctions.
This shift has had domestic political consequences, most notably in the forced resignation of Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s former Foreign Minister who negotiated the JCPOA.
While the deputy chairman of the Iranian parliament's national security committee appears to be adamant that Russia will consider Iran's interests in its negotiations with America, the committee's former chairman has once again expressed concern that "Russia might sacrifice Iran for its own interests."
The remarks of Abbas Moghtadaei, deputy chairman of the Majles national security committee, suggested that Iran's interests factor into Russia’s calculations. "In its negotiations with the United States, Russia also considers Iran's interests," he said.
He argued that Russia would take Iran’s interests into account, citing the recently signed strategic cooperation agreement between the two countries and asserting that Moscow will "consider its ally's interests in its foreign relations." However, Russia has repeatedly stated in the past that Iran is not a strategic ally.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other officials have repeatedly referred to Iran as a partner, distinguishing their relationship from Russia’s formal alliances, such as with China or members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In August 2022, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged the strength of Russia-Iran relations but stopped short of calling Iran a strategic ally.
The hardline Raja News, the pro-reform Fararu website, and the pro-Pezeshkian Etemad newspaper have also rejected the notion of Iran being a strategic ally of Russia. However, Moscow is still likely to back Tehran when it serves its interests, using Iran as regional and international leverage in its dealings with the West.
Meanwhile, in an interview with Etemad, Heshamatollah Falahatpisheh, former chief of the Iranian Parliament's national security and foreign relations committee, stated, "The revival of the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and world powers was sacrificed for Russia's war in Ukraine. I fear Iran may now be sacrificed for Russia’s peace with Ukraine."
He was referring to the West’s reluctance to negotiate with Iran following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which led to the suspension of nuclear talks in March 2022. Since then, Tehran has supported Russia’s war effort, supplying weapons used against Ukraine.
Asked about the likelihood of Iran's interests being compromised in talks between Moscow and Washington, Falahatpisheh said, "Political developments since 2021 have shown that international variables directly affect Iran's nuclear diplomacy and its position in global affairs."
He recalled that three years ago, when Iran and the West were close to reaching a nuclear deal, Russia formally urged the United States to exempt Iran-Russia trade from US sanctions on both countries. However, Washington rejected the request, viewing it as an attempt by Moscow to exploit the nuclear negotiations for its own benefit.
The politician accused Russia of deceiving Iran and obstructing the revival of the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal at the time. Expressing concern over Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent visit to Iran, he warned, "Once again, the Russians might use Iran as leverage in their dealings with Washington."
Meanwhile, Iranian foreign policy analyst Qasem Mohebali told the conservative Nameh News website that "Russia's mediation between Iran and the United States is unlikely to benefit Iran."
"It appears that the Americans have promised certain concessions to Russia regarding the Ukraine war, and in return, Russia has agreed to offer some concessions to Washington concerning Iran," Mohebali said.
However, he argued that this arrangement is not in Iran’s best interest, as "Russia is likely to use Iran as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with the United States over Ukraine." He also questioned the effectiveness of mediation by a country that is itself engaged in negotiations to resolve its own challenges.
"Iran is in an ambiguous international position," Mohebali concluded. "However, the disputes between Europe and the Arab states on one side and the United States on the other, along with the divide between Russia and America, provide Iran with an opportunity to extract some concessions. Still, Moscow's mediation is unlikely to serve Tehran’s interests."
Moscow's entrance onto the scene either flips an Iranian ally against its nuclear ambitions or provides a spoiler which drags out talks and buys the Islamic Republic a breather from looming Israeli strikes.
The initiative follows a direct request from US President Donald Trump during a phone call on February 12, 2025, with subsequent discussions taking place between top officials from both administrations in Saudi Arabia.
The Kremlin has expressed its commitment to facilitating peaceful negotiations between Washington and Tehran. This positions Russia as a key intermediary, leveraging its established relationships with both nations.
Historically, Switzerland has been acting as a diplomatic conduit between Tehran and Washington since the early 1980s. Several Arab states have also offered their mediation services on various occasions, including the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, and, more recently, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Russia’s diplomatic involvement, however, presents a different dynamic.
Deep state access
As a global power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has cultivated a strong security partnership with Iran, particularly since the onset of the Ukraine war in February 2022.
Russia’s unique access to Iran’s deep state provides President Putin with significant leverage to pressure Iranian decision-makers into making nuclear concessions—an essential step in preventing military escalation in the coming months.
From Iran’s perspective, Russian involvement in resolving the “Iranian nuclear problem,” as Russian officials term it, presents both an opportunity and a challenge.
Under Russian diplomatic oversight, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may find it more difficult to maintain his strategy of nuclear escalation vis-à-vis the Trump Administration, including rhetorical threats to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and outright rejection of negotiations.
Tehran might become more open to indirect and discreet dialogue with Washington if Moscow encourages it to do so.
Unlikely boon
Beyond the potential impact on Iran’s nuclear strategy, Russia’s mediating role offers the Iranian political establishment a means to achieve its primary goal: avoiding both war and substantive nuclear or regional negotiations with Washington during Trump’s second term (2025-2029).
A Russian diplomatic intermediary could help ensure the security and survival of the Islamic Republic, deterring a potential US-backed Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But the shifting balance of power following a US-Russia rapprochement means Iran could once again become a bargaining chip in renewed US-Russian diplomatic negotiations at the presidential level.
In other words, a closer Trump-Putin relationship could reduce Tehran’s strategic relevance in Moscow’s eyes. This short-term marginalization of Iran does not signify the end of its pragmatic partnership with Russia but rather the potential reemergence of US influence over Iranian decision-making through Russian mediation.
Since the early 2020s, Iran has advanced its uranium enrichment activities, prompting international concerns over possible nuclear weapon development—claims that Tehran consistently denies despite growing internal political debate on potential nuclear militarization.
The US remains steadfast in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, working closely with allies like Israel to address these concerns. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), designed to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for sanctions relief, has been under strain, especially following the US withdrawal from the agreement in 2018.
This led Iran to deviate from its commitments. A potential future Russian mediating role could temper the Trump Administration’s inclination to align with Israel’s hardline approach against Iran’s nuclear advancements, potentially reducing the likelihood of an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
Mideast: Russian returns
Beyond the Iranian nuclear issue and regional policy, Russia’s recent diplomatic manoeuvres underscore its ambitions to reassert its role in Middle Eastern affairs in the post-October 7 era.
This potential return is facilitated by its ongoing rapprochement with Washington and the possibility of a ceasefire in Ukraine in 2025.
The proposal to restore direct air links between the US and Russia, discussed during negotiations in Istanbul, signifies a potential thaw in relations. Talks also addressed the normalization of embassy operations, reflecting a mutual interest in improving diplomatic and economic ties.
However, Russia’s deepening ties with Iran add complexity to its role as a mediator, especially in the context of rising military tensions between Iran and Israel, the US’s primary ally in the region.
In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive 20-year strategic partnership agreement covering defense, technology, energy, and trade sectors. While this partnership strengthens bilateral relations, it may also compromise Russia’s impartiality in mediating US-Iran tensions.
Looking ahead, Russian mediation could lead to renewed negotiations aimed at reviving or restructuring a nuclear agreement that addresses the shortcomings of the JCPOA.
Such an agreement could ease some economic sanctions on Iran while implementing stricter nuclear oversight. However, the success of these efforts will depend on the willingness of both the US and Iran to engage in constructive dialogue and make necessary concessions.
Russia's strategic interests and geopolitical priorities—particularly in the event of a ceasefire in Ukraine—will play a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of these diplomatic initiatives in the coming months.