Iran International
A fresh debate has erupted in Tehran over Russia’s role in Iran’s foreign policy amid diplomatic moves that may suggest an intermediary role for President Vladimir Putin between the Islamic Republic and its arch-foes Israel and the United States.
Russia said on Friday it was ready to help resolve the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program—a day after former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif accused Moscow of standing in the way of Tehran’s potential path to normalcy with the West.
Zarif reignited long-running suspicions about Moscow’s intentions as Iran’s security chief Ali Larijani visited the Russian capital to deliver a message from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The former head of parliament’s National Security Committee Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh echoed the charge on Friday, asserting that Russia had previously obstructed a potential agreement with the United States in 2021.
“Over-reliance on the Kremlin puts Iran on a dangerous path,” he warned in the economic daily Donya-ye Eghtesad. “Russia is not a trustworthy partner around the world, and ignoring this could be costly.”
Another moderate outlet, Rouydad24, argued in a Friday editorial that “historical experience shows Moscow’s interests do not always align with Tehran’s.”
Lifeline or liability?
Iran’s dependence on Russia—even amid Putin’s hints at goodwill mediation—has long been questioned by moderates who favor a tilt toward the West.
Those calls have intensified since the June war with Israel, when Moscow offered little help—either unwilling, as some in Tehran suggested, or unable due to its own entanglement in Ukraine.
Hardliners, and most crucially the Supreme Leader, appear to think otherwise.
Ali Khamenei has rarely been seen since Israel demonstrated its ability to strike top commanders in June, but the message from those considered closest to him remains unmistakably combative.
Khamenei’s top foreign-policy adviser Kamal Kharrazi said in an interview with the leader’s website that Iran’s missile program and support for armed allies in the region remain non-negotiable.
While emphasizing Iran’s openness to diplomacy, Kharrazi also laid bare Tehran’s limited room for compromise with Washington.
Anti-West line rules
That same day, cleric Alireza Panahian, close to Khamenei’s office, promoted a state-sponsored book advocating Israel’s annihilation—underscoring how deeply confrontation remains embedded in the system’s worldview.
Covering Larijani’s trip to Moscow, hardline outlets invariably hailed him as a “trusted figure,” implying that others, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, were not considered reliable enough to represent Khamenei.
It didn’t help the relatively moderate president that he was filmed cycling through Isfahan as part of a campaign promoting healthy living just as the veteran conservative Larijani delivered Khamenei’s message to Putin.
The image was mocked by social media users who saw it emblematic of a fragmented government in which real authority rests beyond the president's station.
Lavrov has often claimed that Russia “always supported” and helped bring about the 2015 Iranian nuclear accord formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Zarif, however, has argued that Moscow actually tried to prevent it from being finalized.
Back in 2015, I also believed that Moscow was trying to derail the JCPOA.
Zarif recently told a conference in Tehran that Russia did not want Iran to have normal relations with the rest of the world, yet did not wish for Iran to enter direct confrontation with other states either.
In my view, Zarif’s accusation rings true.
Russia's way
Before Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine froze my ability to meet Russian colleagues, I regularly spoke with Russian scholars who were candid about their view of the Iranian-American relationship.
Several indicated that, from their perspective, the worst-case scenario for Russia was not an Iranian nuclear weapon, but an Iranian-American rapprochement. They feared that if such a rapprochement occurred, Tehran would have far less need for Moscow and might even work with Washington against Russian interests.
From their point of view, it was clearly in Russia’s interests for Iranian-American relations to remain hostile.
As for Zarif’s charge that Moscow prefers Iran not to have normal relations but also avoids direct confrontations: this reflects Russia’s standard diplomatic approach. Moscow benefits when countries are at odds, since it can then provide security assistance to one side—or even both.
When adversaries make peace, they tend to focus on economic development and cooperation with the US, Europe or China—but rarely with Russia.
While Moscow profits from tension, it usually does not want outright conflict, as that can expose its unwillingness or inability to support its “allies”—as seen during the recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran.
Despite Iran having sold armed drones and reportedly even ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine, Moscow did virtually nothing to help Tehran during that conflict.
This could have led to a rupture in relations, but ongoing hostility between Iran and the US has kept Tehran tied to its one-sided cooperation with Moscow.
Tehran’s choice
Still, Russia cannot be blamed entirely.
One striking feature of today’s “multipolar” order is how many states in the “Global South” manage to cooperate simultaneously with both the West and with Russia and China. In the Middle East, countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and even Israel maintain such balanced relations.
Washington may be uneasy with this but has largely had to accept it. Moscow, for its part, takes satisfaction in America’s discomfort, though it harbors no illusion that these states would abandon the West in favor of Russia or China. They benefit from good relations with all major powers.
Not so Iran.
Continued hostility with the US prevents Tehran from reaping the benefits of cooperation with Washington, while ensuring that Russia can exploit the relationship without fear of losing Iran to the West.
And this, as Zarif observed, is precisely where Moscow wants Tehran to remain.
Doomed—or not?
It need not be this way.
Syria’s new, formerly jihadist leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has shown that it is possible to build productive ties with America, Europe, Turkey Arab states—and even with Russia, whose forces bombed his rebel movement just last year.
Instead of dwelling on justified grievances against Moscow, Sharaa has focused on how Syria can benefit from engagement with all sides.
It is highly doubtful that Iran’s aging Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would ever countenance rapprochement with the United States. His worldview is too deeply rooted in the revolutionary notion of America as a permanent enemy.
But 86-year-old Khamenei cannot last indefinitely, and leadership change is coming.
However unlikely it seems now, his successor may yet recognize the advantages of setting aside old grievances to improve ties with Washington—and, in turn, to gain leverage over a Russia now wary of losing Iran to Western influence.
Whether the US would reciprocate is another matter. Donald Trump’s willingness—even eagerness—to make deals with long-time adversaries such as Russia and North Korea suggests he might be open to one with Iran as well.
There is, of course, no guarantee this will happen.
It is more likely that Khamenei’s successor will resemble him—someone who refuses “on principle” to allow rapprochement with the US, Europe, or Iran’s Arab neighbors, regardless of the economic benefits such a shift might bring to Iranians.
Meanwhile, Moscow will continue to profit from Iran’s isolation.