Professor Emeritus of Government and Politics, George Mason University
While relations between Moscow and Tehran have generally been good, ties between former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the seemingly perpetual Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are decidedly not.
Lavrov has often claimed that Russia “always supported” and helped bring about the 2015 Iranian nuclear accord formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Zarif, however, has argued that Moscow actually tried to prevent it from being finalized.
Back in 2015, I also believed that Moscow was trying to derail the JCPOA.
Zarif recently told a conference in Tehran that Russia did not want Iran to have normal relations with the rest of the world, yet did not wish for Iran to enter direct confrontation with other states either.
In my view, Zarif’s accusation rings true.
Russia's way
Before Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine froze my ability to meet Russian colleagues, I regularly spoke with Russian scholars who were candid about their view of the Iranian-American relationship.
Several indicated that, from their perspective, the worst-case scenario for Russia was not an Iranian nuclear weapon, but an Iranian-American rapprochement. They feared that if such a rapprochement occurred, Tehran would have far less need for Moscow and might even work with Washington against Russian interests.
From their point of view, it was clearly in Russia’s interests for Iranian-American relations to remain hostile.
As for Zarif’s charge that Moscow prefers Iran not to have normal relations but also avoids direct confrontations: this reflects Russia’s standard diplomatic approach. Moscow benefits when countries are at odds, since it can then provide security assistance to one side—or even both.
When adversaries make peace, they tend to focus on economic development and cooperation with the US, Europe or China—but rarely with Russia.
While Moscow profits from tension, it usually does not want outright conflict, as that can expose its unwillingness or inability to support its “allies”—as seen during the recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran.
Despite Iran having sold armed drones and reportedly even ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine, Moscow did virtually nothing to help Tehran during that conflict.
This could have led to a rupture in relations, but ongoing hostility between Iran and the US has kept Tehran tied to its one-sided cooperation with Moscow.
Tehran’s choice
Still, Russia cannot be blamed entirely.
One striking feature of today’s “multipolar” order is how many states in the “Global South” manage to cooperate simultaneously with both the West and with Russia and China. In the Middle East, countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and even Israel maintain such balanced relations.
Washington may be uneasy with this but has largely had to accept it. Moscow, for its part, takes satisfaction in America’s discomfort, though it harbors no illusion that these states would abandon the West in favor of Russia or China. They benefit from good relations with all major powers.
Not so Iran.
Continued hostility with the US prevents Tehran from reaping the benefits of cooperation with Washington, while ensuring that Russia can exploit the relationship without fear of losing Iran to the West.
And this, as Zarif observed, is precisely where Moscow wants Tehran to remain.
Doomed—or not?
It need not be this way.
Syria’s new, formerly jihadist leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has shown that it is possible to build productive ties with America, Europe, Turkey Arab states—and even with Russia, whose forces bombed his rebel movement just last year.
Instead of dwelling on justified grievances against Moscow, Sharaa has focused on how Syria can benefit from engagement with all sides.
It is highly doubtful that Iran’s aging Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would ever countenance rapprochement with the United States. His worldview is too deeply rooted in the revolutionary notion of America as a permanent enemy.
But 86-year-old Khamenei cannot last indefinitely, and leadership change is coming.
However unlikely it seems now, his successor may yet recognize the advantages of setting aside old grievances to improve ties with Washington—and, in turn, to gain leverage over a Russia now wary of losing Iran to Western influence.
Whether the US would reciprocate is another matter. Donald Trump’s willingness—even eagerness—to make deals with long-time adversaries such as Russia and North Korea suggests he might be open to one with Iran as well.
There is, of course, no guarantee this will happen.
It is more likely that Khamenei’s successor will resemble him—someone who refuses “on principle” to allow rapprochement with the US, Europe, or Iran’s Arab neighbors, regardless of the economic benefits such a shift might bring to Iranians.
Meanwhile, Moscow will continue to profit from Iran’s isolation.
